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HEALTH INSURERS' ASSESSMENT OF MEDICAL NECESSITY
MARK A. HALLt & GERARD F. ANDERSONtt
One can hardly imagine a more difficult choice than that faced
by the district court in Rollo v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield.' In the
judge's own words:
I was called upon to decide whether eight year old Tishna Rollo
could live or whether she must die, a humbling and sobering
decision. Tishna, I was told, had virtually no chance of surviving
the relapsed Wilms' tumor [of the kidney] from which she is
suffering and Blue Cross/Blue Shield had denied coverage for
autologous bone marrow transplant ("ABMT") with accompanying
high dose chemotherapy, a treatment which could well prolong
and quite possibly save her life and which, concededly, provided
her only realistic hope of either. The University of Nebraska
Medical Center ... would not admit her without coverage, her
parents could not afford to pay the projected $130,000-$140,000
costs of the treatment, and there was simply no time to wait, for
Tishna's "window of opportunity" would soon close. The coverage
issue had to be litigated and litigated quickly.
2
Blue Cross denied coverage because the insurance policy covering
Tishna Rollo explicitly excluded "experimental" procedures, and
Blue Cross had concluded that the use of autologous bone marrow
transplant (ABMT)3 to treat Wilms's tumor had not yet been
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I No. 90-597, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5376 (D.NJ. Mar. 22, 1990).
2 Id. at *1-'2.
' ABMT is a therapy that allows much higher doses of chemotherapy and
radiation to be administered to a cancer patient than is ordinarily possible because
of their toxic effects on bone marrow, which supports the immune system. ABMT
involves temporarily removing and freezing a portion of the patient's own bone
marrow (in contrast with allogenic donation by family members, or unrelated
donation, for which there are greater problems of donor availability and patient!
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proven medically appropriate.4  The "experimental" exclusion
common in health insurance policies responds to a growing concern
that most current medical procedures were adopted without ever
having been tested rigorously and that at least some of the proce-
dures commonly used today have limited or no medical value.5 In
donor matching). The marrow is then reinfused after the high dose chemotherapy
or radiation is administered. ABMT has emerged over the past few years as a last-
gasp measure to stop cancers that have not responded to more conventional therapies
or that have "metastasized," that is, entered the blood or lymph system and thus
threatened to cause damage far beyond their initial location. See id. at *3-*5.
The most frequently litigated application of ABMT has been for metastatic breast
cancer. It is a dangerous, painful, and expensive therapy whose success rate varies
according to the particular cancer involved and its precise stage, as well as by the
treatment protocol followed. The therapy itself may cause the patient's death in a
significant number of cases; in others it can produce a temporary reprieve, but its
long-term success has not yet been demonstrated for many cancers. See id. at *1 n.1;
see also Bucci v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 764 F. Supp. 728, 730 (D. Conn. 1991);
Pirozzi v. Blue Gross-Blue Shield, 741 F. Supp. 586, 588 (E.D. Va. 1990); Dozsa v.
Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 131, 133 (D.N.J. 1989); Bruce E. Hillner et al.,
Efficacy and Cost-Effectiveness of Autologous Bone Marrow Transplantation in Metastatic
Breast Cancer, 267JAMA 2055 (1992); Perry C. Panantonis, Comment, Experimental
Exclusions: Are Insurance Companies Really Protected?, 9 N.Y.L. SCH.J. HUM. RTs. 217,
219-20 (1991); Robert Bazell, Topic of Cancer: Autologous Bone Marrow Transplant
Policy, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 31, 1990, at 9.
The debate over the efficacy of ABMT is epitomized by conflicting medical
reports about the health of former presidential candidate Paul Tsongas. At first, his
doctors reported that ABMT successfully treated his lymphoma (cancer of the
immune system). See Lawrence K. Altman, Doctors Say Cancer Therapy has Tsongas in
Good Health, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1992, at Al. More recently, however, his doctors
conceded a relapse following the ABMT treatment, which other doctors interpret as
meaning that the ABMT treatment did not effect a cure. See Lawrence K. Altman,
Doctors Now Say that Tsongas Suffered a Recurrence of Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1992,
at Al.
4 We will use the term "medical appropriateness" to refer generically to medical
necessity, accepted medical practice, cost effective care, cost beneficial care, and the
host of other verbal permutations that describe a normative assessment of what
medical treatment should be performed. Sometimes, we use "medical necessity"
interchangeably to connote this same generic concept of appropriateness because it
is the term that most health insurance contracts adopt. Later in the Article, we will
suggest the adoption of more precise language to describe assessing appropriateness
at different levels. See infra text accompanying notes 201-02.
5 See U.S. BIPARTISAN COMM'N ON COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH CARE (THE PEPPER
COMMISSION), A CALL FOR ACTION: FINAL REPORT 41 (1990) [hereinafter PEPPER
COMMISSION REPORT] (estimating that only 10-20% of the medical procedures used
today have been subjected to randomized clinical trials-the most conclusive method
of determining if a procedure is medically effective). A recent study found, for
example, that a medical procedure used for the past 50 years has no statistically
significant clinical value. See WallaceJ. Epstein et al., Effect of Parenterally Administered
Gold Therapy on the Course of Adult Rheumatoid Arthritis, 114 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
437 (1991).
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the view of many health policy analysts, one reason so many
unproven medical procedures have diffused into common medical
practice is that insurers have been unwilling or unable to deny
payment for care whose clinical efficacy is still in doubt.
6
By requiring clinicians to prove that new procedures are
efficacious before they are covered, the hope is that existing
resources will be better allocated to maximize the health status of
the overall population. 7 Thus, efforts to spend health dollars more
wisely may ultimately enable the approximately 35 million Ameri-
cans without health insurance to obtain coverage, 8 foster adequate
prenatal care, 9 and make long-term-care insurance affordable.
10
Nevertheless, the judge in Rollo decided that Blue Cross should pay
for the treatment. I Sixteen other courts over the past two years
have also ruled that ABMT is not experimental, and they have
ordered private insurers to pay the costs of administering it to
terminally ill cancer patients, most often for metastatic breast
cancer.1 2 In about a dozen similar cases, however, judges have
6 See infra text accompanying notes 96 & 112.
7 Victor Fuchs was one of the first economists to suggest that excessive use of
sophisticated medical technology may do little to improve overall health status. See
VICTOR FUCHS, WHO SHALL LIvE? HEALTH, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIAL CHOICES 94-95
(1974).
8 As many as 35 million Americans do not have health insurance. See M. Eugene
Moyer, A Revised Look at the Number of UninsuredAmericans, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Summer
1989, at 102, 102; see also PEPPER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 22. The
Pepper Commission's and others' proposals for universal access are hampered by the
political infeasibility of committing more public funding resources.
9 Only 60% of American Indian, Mexican-American, African-American, and Puerto
Rican mothers receive prenatal care in the first trimester of pregnancy compared to
80% of White, Cuban, and Asian mothers. See NATIONAL CTR. FOR HEALTH
STATISTICS, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 1990, at 9 (1990). Moreover, infant mortality
rates (the proportion of deaths in the first year of life) are 50% higher for American
Indians and 40% higher for Puerto Ricans than for non-Hispanic whites. See id. at 11.
10 The Pepper Commission developed a proposal for long-term-care insurance
whose fully implemented cost is $42.8 billion. See PEPPER COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 5, at 16. Congress has deferred action on the proposal until a funding source
can be found.
" See Rollo, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5376, at *2-*3 ("Tishna's parents, who knew
that they had medical insurance and quite understandably believed that when their
daughter became ill Blue Cross/Blue Shield would pay for the treatment of illness,
should not have had to come to this court.").
12 See Adams v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 757 F. Supp. 661 (D. Md. 1991); Bucci
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 764 F. Supp. 728 (D. Conn. 1991); White v. Caterpillar,
765 F. Supp. 1418 (W.D. Mo. 1991); Kulakowski v. Rochester Hospital Service Corp.,
No. 91-CV6505T (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 17,1991); Clark v. K-Mart Corporation, No. 91-1431
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 1991); Reiffv. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, No. 90-C-1030-E (N.D.
Okla. Feb. 11, 1991); Cole v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 738 F. Supp. 42 (D. Mass.
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ruled that the use of ABMT is still experimental and denied
coverage.
13
These dramatic rulings have been viewed by the popular press
and the health policy community alike as an extraordinary develop-
ment.1 4  From a legal perspective, however, these rulings are
merely the latest in a long series of ordinary contract disputes over
the interpretation of terms such as "medical necessity" or "experi-
mental," which determine the coverage of health insurance
1990); Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 741 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Va. 1990); Stewart v.
Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 90-875-A (E.D. Va. Aug. 7, 1990); Thomas v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, No. 90-10831-H (D. Mass. Apr. 5, 1990); Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins.
Co., 716 F. Supp. 131 (D.N.J. 1989); Miller v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, No. 91-E-41 1-
B (N.H. Super. Ct. Oct. 2, 1991); Terninko v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, No. 91-E-517-
B (N.H. Super. Ct. Sept. 24, 1991); Bradley v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 562
N.Y.S.2d 908 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990); Speed v. Prudential Health Care Plan, No. 90-1470
(Va. Ch. Nov. 19, 1990). As of this writing, three dozen additional ABMT cases have
been settled or are pending in the federal courts. See BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD
AsS'N, INVESTIGATIONAL EXCLUSIONS: A SUMMARY OF THE CASE LAW at VI-1 to VI-8
(1992).
For other reviews of this body of litigation, see Frank P.James, The Experimental
Treatment Exclusion Clause: A Tool for Silent Rationing of Health Care?, 12 J. LEGAL
MED. 359 (1991) (proposing a dearer definition of "experimental"); PaulJ. Molino,
Reimbursement Disputes Involving Experimental Medical Treatment, 24J. HEALTH & HosP.
L. 329 (1991) (same); Jennifer Belk, Comment, Undefined Experimental Treatment
Exclusions in Health Insurance Contracts: A Proposal forJudicial Response, 66 U. WASH.
L. REV. 809 (1991) (supporting these rulings); Panantonis, supra note 3 (criticizing
these decisions). See generallyJulia F. Costich, Note, Denial of Coverage for "Experimen-
tal" Medical Procedures: The Problem of De Novo Review under ERISA, 79 KY. L.J. 801
(1991) (discussing ABMT along with other experimental treatments).
13 See Harris v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 729 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Tex. 1991);
Schnitker v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, No. CV-91-0-412 (D. Neb. Nov. 11, 1991);
Farley v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., No. 90-761 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 17, 1991); West v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, No. 91-582 (D. Or. Oct. 1, 1991); Holder v. Prudential, No.
W-89-CA 172 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 1990); Sweeney v. Gerber Prod. Co. Medical
Benefits Plan, 728 F. Supp. 594 (D. Neb. 1989); Thomas v. Gulf Health Plan, 688 F.
Supp. 590 (S.D. Ala. 1988); Green Hosp. v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 393 (1991); Evans
v. HMO Colorado, No. 91CV3797 (Colo. Dist. Ct. June 14, 1991); Whittle v. Blue
Cross/Blue Shield, No. 87-CP-15-625 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Colleton CountyJan. 17, 1990);
Hurowitz vs. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, No. N-7849-4 (Va. Cir. Ct. May 19, 1989)
(transcript of hearing on motion for preliminary injunction).
The position that ABMT is still experimental may have been strengthened by a
recent National Institutes of Health decision to conduct a randomized clinical trial of
women with metastatic breast cancer seeking ABMT; randomized clinical trials can
be conducted only if the medical effectiveness of the procedure is in doubt. See Curt
Suplee, Blue Cross Agrees to Fund Breast Cancer Experiment: Women to Undergo Bone
Marrow Transplants, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1990, at Al
14 See Lee N. Newcomer, Defining Experimental Therapy-A Third-Party Payer's
Dilemma, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1702 (1990); Franklin M. Zweig & Seymour Perry,
Health Care Goes to Court: Judges Need Access to Impartial Medical Expertise, WASH. POST,
July 17, 1990, Health Section, at 6.
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policies.15 For the most part, these previous contract disputes
involved treatment at the periphery of traditional medicine with
only modest amounts of money at stake. 16  Now, however, the
stakes are much higher on both sides. The treatments now being
questioned are very expensive new procedures that if performed on
a widespread basis could leave more people uninsured and drive up
costs for those who remain covered. These treatments, however,
may also offer an individual patient's only hope of survival. Thus,
bone marrow transplant cases present one of the core problems that
perplex this country's health care financing policy: should we rely
on rigorous empirical evidence before making collective decisions
to spend our limited health care resources, or should we continue
to rely on the individual physician's and patient's judgment about
the appropriate treatment in each case?
This Article examines whether courts should allow both
public17 and private insurers to control health care costs by
15 See infra text accompanying notes 20-44. This case law is summarized inJOHN
A. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 705.35,709.75 (1981 & Supp. 1991);
Alan Bloom, Interpretation of Insurance Policy Coverage in the Case of Ambiguity-Or How
Big is the Consumer's Piece of the Rock?, 3 WHITTIER L. REv. 177 (1981);James S. Cline
& Keith A. Rosten, The Effect of Policy Language on the Containment of Health Care Cost,
21 TORT & INS. L.J. 120 (1985); James S. Cline & Keith A. Rosten, The Effect of Policy
Language on the Containment of Health Care Cost: A Footnote, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 653
(1986); Paul E. Kalb, Controlling Health Care Costs by Controlling Technology: A Private
ContractualApproach, 99 YALE L.J. 1109 (1989); Grace P. Monaco & Rebecca L. Burke,
Insurer as Gatekeeper: Handling Claims for Unproven Methods of Medical Management, 18
FORUM 591 (1983); Grace P. Monaco & Rebecca L. Burke, Insurer as Gatekeeper-Part
Two: Policy Obstacles in Unproven Methods of Litigation, 20 FORUM 400 (1985)
[hereinafter Monaco & Burke, Gatekeeper Part Two]; Annotation, What Services,
Equipment or Supplies are "Medically Necessaty"for Purposes of Coverage Under Medical
Insurance, 75 A.L.R. 4TH 763 (1990).
16 The only other area of serious dispute has been major organ transplantation
(heart, lung, liver, pancreas). See e.g.,Johnson v. District 2 Marine Eng'rs Beneficial
Ass'n, 857 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1988) (upholding denial of coverage for liver
transplant). Most private insurers pay for such procedures, but when they do not,
these coverage denials usually do not produce litigation because they are based on
explicit contractual exclusions of the particular procedures rather than on general
"medically unnecessary" or "experimental" exclusions. See Thomas Musco, Insurance
Coverage for Organ and Tissue Transplants in HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICA RESEARCH BULLETIN R1489 (Nov. 1989);Joel E. Miller, The Private Insurer
Response to Advanced Health Care Technology: The Case of Organ Transplants, in
PEDIATRIC BRAIN DEATH AND ORGAN/TISSUE RETRIEvAL: MEDICAL, ETHICAL, AND
LEGAL ASPECTS 331 (Howard H. Kaufman ed., 1990).
17 The federal government's interest in assessing medical appropriateness is
demonstrated by the creation of a new agency within the Public Health Service, the
Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, whose mandate is to determine and
then promote effective medical care. In 1991, approximately $60 million was
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denying payment for specific services based on the insurers'
judgments of medical appropriateness. Our primary focus in on
private insurers; however, there is significant overlap with public
sector activities because private insurers rely on governmental
assessments to guide their decisions, and because the statutory
terms of coverage under public programs resemble the coverage
terms in private insurance contracts. Therefore, although we
concentrate on the case law that interprets private insurance
contracts, the Article's conclusions and policy implications extend
to the public sector.
First, we set in perspective the most recent litigation by
describing how the cases have evolved from the interplay of
litigation and insurers' responses to prior cycles of judicial deci-
sions. Next, we develop a normative model of who should decide
questions of medical appropriateness for the purposes of insurance
coverage and what criteria they should employ. In particular, we
critique the role the courts have played in making and reviewing
medical appropriateness determinations. In the final section, we set
forth a proposal for reforming the process of determining medical
appropriateness. We specify a new medical necessity review
mechanism and analyze how this initiative is likely to fare in the
present legal climate.
Our focus is on the policy dimensions of how insurers currently,
and in the future are likely to, make medical appropriateness
determinations. As such, this analysis differs from other articles
that focus on the doctrinal elements of the case law18 or address-
ing collateral legal issues such as the potential malpractice or
antitrust liability exposure that results from making medical
appropriateness determinations.19 Our principal concern is with the
allocated to support research teams to develop guidelines for appropriate medical
practice. See HSR REPORTS (Ass'n. of Health Servs. Res.), Mar. 1991, at 3. These
guidelines are intended to influence Medicare and Medicaid coverage decisions as
well as physicians' practice patterns. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 299-299c (Supp. 1989).
18 For examples of such articles, see those cited supra note 15.
19 For a sampling, see AMA, LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF PRACTICE PARAMETERS
(1990); John D. Blum, An Analysis of Legal Liability in Health Care Utilization Review
and Case Management, 26 HOus. L. REV. 191 (1989); SandraJ. Byrnes, Corporation's
Institution of Health Care Utilization Review: Legal Risks, 33 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 478
(1987); Clark C. Havighurst, Applying Antitrust Law to Collaboration in the Production
of Information: The Case of Medical Technology Assessment, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1983, at 341; William A. Helvestine, Legal Implications of Utilization Review, in
CONTROLLING COSTS AND CHANGING PATIENT CARE? THE ROLE OF UTILIZATION
MANAGEMENT 169 (MarilynJ. Field & Bradford H. Gray eds., 1989); Nathan Hershey,
Fourth-Party Audit Organizations: Practical and Legal Considerations, 14 LAW MED. &
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core contractual questions of whether and under what terms the
courts will allow insurers to play any significant role in assessing
medical judgment through their coverage policies.
Other articles in this Symposium address more explicitly the
theme of rationing medical care-that is, withholding useful
treatment based solely on its cost. Because our primary focus is
somewhat different, we prefer not to frame our discussion in terms
of rationing. We consider whether insurers may exercise indepen-
dent judgment on questions of medical benefit or comparative cost
effectiveness (concepts we define with more precision later). We do
not necessarily advocate that insurers should play an explicit
rationing role. To the extent this Article is conceived of in terms
of rationing, however, the issue properly framed is whether
potential subscribers should be allowed to seek more superior forms
of rationing than those that presently exist, not whether insurer
rationing should be permitted at all. The traditional coverage terms
of public and private health insurance, as those terms have been
interpreted by the courts, presently ration by rendering insurance
unaffordable for entire categories of medical care (nursing home,
mental health, and dental, for example), or by rendering health
insurance entirely unaffordable for thirty-five million people. Even
HEALTH CARE 54 (1986); Martin Rose & Robert F. Leibenluft, Antitrust Implications
of Medical Technology Assessment, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1490 (1986).
Not only are the malpractice and antitrust issues secondary to whether insurers
may engage in medical necessity review to begin with, but the legal barriers they
construct are less imposing ones. Most analysts agree that, as long as insurers act
independently in making their determinations, antitrust considerations are of little
consequence unless a particular insurer enjoys strong market power. See Rose &
Leibenluft, supra, at 1493; Havighurst, supra, at 364-69. Malpractice considerations
are potentially of greater concern, except for the fact that much of what falls under
this tort-law rubric in ordinary patient-physician treatment relationships is displaced
by contract law, given the extensive contractual underpinnings of the patient-insurer
relationship. Thus, the most significant malpractice case to date, Wickline v. State,
239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), concerned a governmental review mechanism
that had no contractual status. The court held that California was not liable in
damages resulting from the denial of coverage to a Medicaid recipient. When the
same court confronted a private review mechanism, it distinguished Wickline,
observing that the contract between the parties governed the insurer's responsibilities.
See Wilson v. Blue Cross, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 879 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), review denied,
No. SO17315, 1990 Cal. LEXIS 4574 (Oct. 11, 1990). Although the court, as a
consequence, ruled that Blue Cross was subject to greater liability than Medi-Cal (the
California Medicaid agency), this holding was specific to the factual circumstances of
Wilson, which included a contract that contained no clear authorization for Blue
Cross to conduct precertification review. Since most contracts will contain this
explicit authorization, it is a certainty that in future cases contract law will have far
more immediate application to the respective rights and responsibilities than tort law.
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if allowing public and private insurers to exercise greater oversight
of medical appropriateness were viewed as tantamount to insurer
rationing (which is not necessarily the case), this could only improve
the existing blunt form of rationing.
I. PoLICY CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING OLD AND NEW
JUDICIAL RULINGS
Although the ABMT cases seemed to emerge overnight, they are
a logical outgrowth of decades of litigation involving private
insurers' coverage decisions. Understanding this history and the
policy issues underlying this large body of case law helps set the
present controversy in its proper framework. This analysis will show
that the inclination of judges to adopt every conceivable argument
in favor of coverage has essentially precluded insurers from
exercising any meaningful oversight of medical appropriateness.
A. Retroactive Denials of Coverage
Because the hospital industry gave birth to modern private
health insurance in the United States, it is not surprising that
private insurers were initially very deferential to both hospitals and
physicians. 20 At first, insurance policies contained no explicit
20 According to a classic book on the health insurance industry written three
decades ago:
[T]here is little evidence that most of the industry has any real interest in
developing effective controls over the costs of medical care.... The links
between Blue Cross and the hospitals, and Blue Shield and the medical
societies, are well known. Less visible but, in some subtle ways, even more
powerful is the long-standing alliance between the [commercial] insurance
industry and organized medicine. The [commercial] insurance companies
are highly reluctant-on legal, historical, and political grounds-to assume
any such responsibility.
HERMAN M. SOMERS & ANNE R. SOMERS, DOCTORS, PATIENTS AND HEALTH INSURANCE
414-15 (1961); see also PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE 290-300,306-10,327-34 (1982) (describing the establishment of Blue Cross
by hospitals and Blue Shield by physicians). For descriptions of the gradual adoption
of cost control through coverage restriction by Blue Cross/Blue Shield and
commercial insurers, see SYLVIA LAW, BLUE CROSS: WHAT WENT WRONG? 59-63, 93-
102 (1974); Barbara Greenberg & Robert A. Derzon, Determining Health Insurance
Coverage of Technology: Problems and Options, 19 MED. CARE 967, 971-73 (1981); Clark
C. Havighurst, Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health Care Financing, 1978
DUKE LJ. 303, 338; FredJ. Hellinger, Controlling Costs by AdjustingPaymentforMedical
Technologies, 19 INQUIRY 34, 38-41 (1982).
Because Blue Cross/Blue Shield and commercial insurance providers administer
claims payment under Medicare, whose terms of coverage mirror those in standard
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medical necessity limitations or review mechanisms. Instead, they
covered, within defined monetary and service limits, all care
ordered by any physician.21 To the extent that private insurers
restricted coverage in any form, it was through design of their
benefit package. For example, a package might have covered only
hospital care or only specified diseases.22 Insurers first began
questioning thejudgment of individual physicians in the 1960s when
they were asked to pay for the use of hospital facilities for such
purposes as weight reduction or resting up from a fall.23 Even
these mild protests were generally unsuccessful in court, howev-
er.24 Judicial deference to the practicing physician in this period
reached its pinnacle in Duncan v. J.C. Penney Life Insurance Co., 25
where the court required coverage for two three-week periods of
hospitalization for a husband and wife for bruises and sprains,
under facts that "strongly indicate[d] a motive on the part of the
Duncans ... to reap financial gain."26 The court ordered the
insurer to pay even though the Duncans's doctor admitted that the
care could have been administered at home and five other doctors
agreed that hospitalization was medically unnecessary.
In response to these rulings, insurers began to revise their
contracts by inserting an explicit requirement of "medical necessi-
insurance contracts, the same attitude carries over into the realm of public insurance.
21 See, e.g., Mount Sinai Hosp. v. Zorek, 271 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1966)
(involving such a contract). Surprisingly, this language still persists in some
contemporary contracts. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 565
F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Schroeder v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 450 N.W.2d
470 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
22 See Note, Controlling Health Care Costs Through Commercial Insurance Companies,
1978 DUKE L.J. 728.
23 According to one account, Blue Cross's efforts to require physicians merely to
certify medical necessity and length of stay in order crack down on fraud were
considered "drastic measures" and "desperate moves." SOMERS & SOMERS, supra note
20, at 416.
24 For instances, insurers were forced to pay for treatment in the following cases:
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 193 S.E.2d 173 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972) (intestinal bypass
surgery for refractory obesity); Myerson v. Associated Hosp. Serv., 314 N.Y.S.2d 834
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968) (hospitalization for observation of abdominal pains); Zorek, 271
N.Y.S.2d 1012 (three week hospitalization for dietary regime for extreme obesity).
25 388 So. 2d 470 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
26 Id. at 472. The couple had duplicative coverage under nine separate policies
amounting to several times more than the actual cost of treatment, and they had
"been hospitalized for more than four months [over the prior three years] and [had]
claimed in some nine lawsuits against these companies during that time, over
$15,000." Id. Nevertheless, the court ordered coverage because the insurance policy
did not explicitly require medical necessity and because the wife had several small
children at home who prevented her from resting. See id. at 471.
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ty."27 This, they thought, would give them the flexibility to deny
potentially unnecessary medical care or care that might actually be
harmful to patients. They continued, however, to lose their
challenges with regularity, even under the most extreme facts.
28
For instance, they were required to pay for alternative cancer
therapies such as laetrile and "immuno-augmentative" treatment
that were outlawed in the United States but delivered in Mexican
and Caribbean clinics.
29
27 "Medical necessity" is not intended to mean life-or-death necessity but merely
medically appropriate or medically beneficial. The intent is to exclude coverage for
care that is harmful, of no benefit, or nonstandard. See generally Dallis v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 574 F. Supp. 547 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (collecting cases that discuss the meaning
of the term), af/'d, 768 F.2d 1303 (11th Cir. 1985).
28 See, e.g., Taylor v. Prudential Ins. Co., 775 F.2d 1457 (11th Cir.) (reversing
summaryjudgment on bad faith liability for insurer's refusal to pay $11,500 for an
eight-month hospitalization following stroke, even though Medicare had determined
that hospitalization was not medically necessary), reh'g en banc denied, 781 F.2d 905
(11th Cir. 1985); Ex Parte Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 401 So. 2d 783, 783 (Ala. 1981)
(holding that two-week hospitalization following fall and fracture should be covered,
even though personal physician testified as the only expert witness that "he did not
consider such hospitalization 'medically necessary'"); Aberathyv. Prudential Ins. Co.,
264 S.E. 2d 836 (S.C. 1980) (holding that facial hair removal was medically necessary
within the meaning of the policy at issue).
Insurers were sometimes able to prevail, however. See, e.g., Margolis v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 629 F. Supp. 195 (D.D.C. 1985) (holding that hospitalization of comatose
patient was not medically necessary); Franks v. Louisiana Health Serv. & Indemn. Co.,
382 So. 2d 1064 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that insurer may deny coverage for
hospitalizations to treat sore throat and colds); Kinzie v. Physician's Liab. Ins. Co.,
750 P.2d 1140 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that trial court was authorized to rule
as matter of law that in vitro fertilization is not necessary to treat an illness; child
birth is elective).
29 See, e.g., Dallis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 768 F.2d 1303, 1304 (11th Cir. 1985)
(holding that coverage exists for "immuno-augmentative therapy" for cancer, costing
$11,000 and provided in a Bahamanian clinic, even though it has "never been
approved by any of the various agencies of the United States Government, nor has
it ever been proven to be effective"); Shumake v. Travelers Ins. Co., 383 N.W.2d 259
(Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that insurer must pay $17,478 for laetrile and
nutritional therapy for lung cancer, even though FDA disapproval meant that it was
illegal to ship laetrile in interstate commerce), appeal denied, 425 Mich. 859 (1986);
Tudor v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 539 N.Y.S.2d 690, 692 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989)
(finding coverage for mercury vapor testing by a physician who "treats the whole
person, with biochemical methods and emphasis on elemental deficiencies and food
allergies"); Taulbee v. Travelers Co., 537 N.E.2d 670 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (finding
coverage for immuno-augmentative therapy for cancer); Wilson v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
605 P.2d 1327 (Okla. 1980) (holding that insurer must pay for laetrile). But see Free
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 551 F. Supp. 554 (D. Md. 1982) (finding no coverage for
laetrile); Bruno v. Security Gen. Life Ins. Co., 522 So. 2d 1242 (La. Ct. App. 1988)
(finding no coverage for nutritional supplements prescribed by "holistic" physician);
Jacob v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 758 P.2d 382 (Or. Ct. App. 1988) (affirming
summaryjudgment for insurer who denied coverage for Gerson therapy (for cancer)
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By the end of the 1970s, many insurers had adopted two new
contractual revisions in response to this additional round of
losses:30 first, they specified that medical necessity is to be deter-
mined in the insurer's judgment,31 and second, they explicitly
excluded payment for "experimental" or "investigational" proce-
dures.3 2 The recent bone marrow transplant cases, as well as
administered in Tijuana, Mexico and immuno-augmentative therapy received in the
Bahamas).
30 Almost identical language was adopted by the government to define the
coverage of Medicare and Medicaid. The Medicare statute precludes payment for
treatments that are not "reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of
illness or injury." 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1) (1988). The Medicaid statute has been
construed similarly to require states to cover all "medically necessary services." See
Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438,444 (1977) (stating that "serious statutory questions might
be presented if a state Medicaid plan excluded necessary medical treatment from its
coverage," citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396, 1396a(10)(c) (1988)). Interpretive guidelines
issued under Medicare state further that, "in making [a coverage] decision, a basic
consideration is whether the service has come to be generally accepted by the
professional medical community as an effective and proven treatment" and that
payment may not be made "for any experimental, investigational, or unproven
treatment." Experimental Investigational Items or Services, Medicare & Medicaid Guide
(CCH) 1 28,152 (1976); Goodman v. Sullivan, 891 F.2d 449, 450 (2d Cir. 1989)
(paraphrasing Medicare Part B Carrier's Manual); see also 54 Fed. Reg. 4302 (1989)
(codifying these standards).
Additional congruity between the terms of coverage under private and public
insurance results from the fact that Medicare contracts with private insurance
companies to handle routine claims administration. See Timothy P. Blanchard,
"Medical Necessity" Denials as a Medicare Part B Cost-Containment Strategy: Two Wrongs
Don't Make It Right or Rational, 34 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 939, 955 (1990).
3' A typical provision excludes coverage for treatment that is "'not medically
necessary-i.e., when in the judgment of the Carrier the medical services did not
require the acute hospital bedpatient (overnight) setting'" and states that "'[t]he fact
that a physician may prescribe, order, recommend, or approve a service or supply
does not, of itself, make it medically necessary.'" Franks v. Louisiana Health Serv. &
Indemn. Co., 382 So. 2d 1064, 1066 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (quoting the policy at issue
in the case); see also Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 741 F. Supp. 586, 589 n.5 (E.D.
Va. 1990) ("'[B]enefits will be denied if the Plan determines, in its sole discretion, that
care is not Medically Necessary.'" (quoting the policy at issue in the case)); Blue Cross
& Blue Shield v. Smither, 573 S.W.2d 363, 364 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (involving
language to the same effect). For a survey of typical contract provisions, see Miller,
supra note 16, at 334-35.
32 Typical language reads:
To be considered medically necessary a service or supply must meet all of
these tests. a. It is ordered by a doctor. b. It is commonly and customarily
recognized throughout the doctor's profession as appropriate in the
treatment of the sickness or injury. c. It is neither educational nor experimen-
tal in nature nor provided primarily for research purposes.
Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 131, 134 (D.N.J. 1989) (quoting the
policy at issue in the case).
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decisions overruling insurers' denials of coverage for more routine
treatment,3 3 demonstrate, however, that these contractual revisions
still have not convinced the courts to accept insurers' assessments
of medical appropriateness.
When deciding in favor of the patient, the courts routinely
profess to limit the scope of their ruling to the unique facts in each
case, as if to justify in their own mind that a generous ruling will
not extend beyond the particular case.34 The courts continually
offer the assurance that if the contract had been properly phrased,
the insurer would have prevailed. When insurers follow this advice,
they still lose when courts, confronted with the same suggested
modifications, find the contract "ambiguous" or contrary to the
policyholder's "reasonable expectations. " 35  For example, the
The precise meaning and relationship between the two terms "experimental" and
"investigational" has never been clear. See, e.g., Amy Green, HMO Won't Fund Dying
Patient's 'Experimental'Drug Therapy, AM. MED. NEW, Jan. 13, 1989, at 1, 17 ("When
[one subscriber] first read the [HMO] handbook, she ... did not know what an
experimental procedure was. It wasn't defined or referred to further. She knew she
did not want to be a subject in a medical experiment, though."). It is generally
supposed, however, that experimental procedures are those for which basic safety or
effectiveness are still in doubt, whereas investigational procedures are those thought
to have medical benefit in some circumstances, but the precise clinical indications and
protocols for treatment still have not been sufficiently standardized.
Because physicians constantly strive to improve safety and effectiveness by fine
tuning all treatment methods, insurers have not been able to define when a new
treatment passes out of the investigational stage and into the accepted-with-ongoing-
improvement stage. See Pirozzi, 741 F. Supp. at 593 ("Use of a protocol does not, by
itself, indicate that a procedure is experimental. Were this not so, much of medicine
might be swept within the ambit of the experimental exclusion provision as there is
ongoing investigation across the whole range of medicine, including many well-
established procedures." (footnote omitted)).
33 See infra note 42.
34 See, e.g., Pirozzi, 741 F. Supp. at 594 ("Of course, a different experimental
exclusion, or different expert testimony, or a plan that conferred broad discretion on
the administrator might well require a different result."); Dozsa, 716 F. Supp. at 136,
139 (holding that insurer must cover ABMT for multiple myeloma cancer despite
explicit testimony that such treatment was "investigational," because insurer excluded
"experimental" care and care not "commonly and customarily recognized" in its
contract, but did not exclude "investigational" treatment); Shumake v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 383 N.W.2d 259, 265 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (approving laetrile only for this one
patient), appeal denied, 425 Mich. 859 (1986).
35 For example, insurers have been unable to exclude coverage for temporoman-
dibular joint syndrome (TMJ), a condition of chronic facial pain caused by
misalignment of the jaw. TMJ is thought by many medical professionals to be over-
diagnosed and over-treated. Some insurers have relied on a generic exclusion of
"dental services" to refuse coverage for TMJ treatment by dentists and oral surgeons,
but courts have struck down these denials reasoning that "dentistry" is too ambiguous
a term to rely on in these circumstances. See Masella v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 936
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Duncan court found the contract defective because it failed to
require "medical necessity," 6 even though countless other courts
have found this term hopelessly ambiguous and therefore unen-
forceable.8 7 When insurers first refused to pay for unapproved
drugs, the courts chastised them for failing explicitly to exclude
coverage for "experimental" drugs,38 yet this is the very language
courts are now refusing to enforce in the ABMT cases.
39
These and other contradictions in the courts' rulings create the
appearance of a judiciary driven by a single-minded concern for
extending coverage to patients in desperate situations at all
costs.40 In addition to this humanitarian objective, the courts have
been concerned about the perceived unfairness of a retroactive
denial of coverage after a patient has relied on his physician's advice
and incurred a bill for treatment later found by the insurer to be
inappropriate. 41  These concerns led to the position that, in
F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1991); Goss v. Medical Serv., 462 A.2d 442 (D.C. 1983); McFadden
v. American United Life Ins. Co., 658 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. 1983). Insurers responded
by excluding TMJ explicitly, in one case with a clause that goes on for 18 lines. See
Alice G. Gosfield, Value Purchasing and Effectiveness: Legal Implications, in 1991
HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 185, 203 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 1991). When confronted
with these more precisely worded exclusions, however, some courts have continued
to balk, reasoning that the language is too technical and complex for lay policyholders
to understand. See Ponder v. Blue Cross, 193 Cal. Rptr. 632 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
56 See Duncan, 388 So. 2d at 470.
37 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
38 See McLaughlin v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 434,449 (N.D.
Cal. 1983); see also Shumake, 383 N.W.2d at 263 n.2 ("[The insurer] could limit
coverage to drugs and medicines which have not been renounced by the American
Medical Association or exclude drugs and treatment which are controversial.").
" See supra note 12.
40 The courts' desire to rule in favor of the patient can result in reasoning that
borders on the-absurd. Consider, for example, ExParte Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 401
So. 2d 783 (Ala. 1981). The court refused to allow Blue Cross to use to its advantage
the trial court's ruling that the attending physician has sole authority to determine
medical necessity. Blue Cross introduced the doctor's admission that hospitalization
was not medically necessary, but the court noted that the policy did not bind Blue
Cross to the doctor's opinion on the matter, because it allowed the carrier to make
its own independent judgment of medical necessity. See id. at 785-86. Then, the
court decided that since Blue Cross was not bound by the doctor's opinion, the issue
of medical necessity should have been submitted to the jury. See id. at 786.
41 See Hughes v. Blue Cross, 263 Cal. Rptr. 850 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). The Hughes
court stated:
If the insurer employs a standard of medical necessity significantly at
variance with the medical standards of the community, the insured will
accept the advice of his treating physician at a risk of incurring liability not
likely foreseen at the time of entering the insurance contract.... [G]ood
faith demands a construction of medical necessity consistent with communi-
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deciding what is "medically necessary" or "experimental," the
doctor's decision should control.4 2 After all, the insurance compa-
ny has a conflict of interest; once it collects its premium dollars,
anything it pays out in claims affects its profit margin. This judicial
attitude has rendered unreliable any agreement that allows the
ty medical standards that will minimize the patient's uncertainty of coverage
in accepting his physician's recommended treatment.
Id. at 857. In Mount Sinai Hosp. v. Zorek, 271 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (Civ. Ct. 1966), the
court stated:
Only the treating physician can determine what the appropriate treatment
should be for any given condition. Any other standard would involve
intolerable second-guessing, with every case calling for a crotchety Doctor
Gillespie to peer over the shoulders of a supposedly unseasoned Doctor
Kildare. The diagnosis and treatment of a patient are matters peculiarly
within the competence of the treating physician. The diagnosis may be
insightful and brilliant, or it may be wide of the mark, but right or wrong,
the patient under his doctor's guidance proceeds upon his theories and
sustains expenses therefor.
Id. at 1016.
42 See Marker v. Union Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 125 F.R.D. 121 (M.D.N.C. 1989), affd
per curiam, 907 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1990) (awarding summaryjudgment to the patient
for his appendectomy done for purely preventative, exploratory reasons and asserting
that "the determination of what was reasonable and necessary was for the licensed,
treating physician"); Van Vactor v. Blue Cross Ass'n, 365 N.E.2d 638, 643 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1977) (stating that where patient was hospitalized to remove impacted teeth,
"[t]here was sufficient evidence... that the insured was justified in relying on the
good faith judgment of his treating physician as to the medical necessity of services
prescribed"); Carrao v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 454 N.E.2d 781, 788 (Ill. App. Ct.
1983) (stating that Van Vactor remains good law in the absence of an explicit
contractual provision to the contrary); Little v. Blue Cross, Inc., 424 N.Y.S.2d 553
(N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (insurer bound by the good-faith certification of the insured's
doctor that private duty nurse was needed during recovery from heart attack, even
while in hospital). See generally Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 193 S.E.2d 173, 176
(Ga. Ct. App. 1972) (giving great weight to physician's recommendation); Siegal v.
Health Care Serv. Corp., 401 N.E.2d 1037, 1043 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) ("[T]he jury
could have found that [the attending physician's] recommendation, absent substantial
reasons for the insurer's rejection, was sufficient to demonstrate compliance with the
requirements of [the] policy."); Shumake, 383 N.W.2d at 263-64 (confronting a
coverage dispute involving laetrile and nutritional therapy for lung cancer, the court
stated that "a physician's judgment should be accorded deference" and that "[a]
physician is generally better equipped than lawyers and judges to discern what is
medically necessary," although the court did not require absolute deference to such
judgments).
Similar rulings have been made under Medicare and Medicaid. See Weaver v.
Reagen, 886 F.2d 194, 200 (8th Cir. 1989) ("The Medicaid statute and regulatory
scheme create a presumption in favor of the medical judgment of the attending
physician in determining the medical necessity of treatment."); Pinneke v. Preisser,
623 F.2d 546, 550 (8th Cir. 1980) ("The decision of whether or not certain treatment
or a particular type of surgery... is 'medically necessary' rests with the individual
recipient's physician and not with clerical personnel or government officials.").
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insurer to police medical decisionmaking. 43 Since this limitation
has been enforced covertly through several cycles of strained
contract interpretation rather than by explicit announcement, its
validity and implications have not been fully considered.44
B. Prospective Denials of Coverage
1. The Emergence of Prospective Utilization Review
Until recently, thejudicial constraint on market contracting had
relatively minor ramifications. Insurers issued only a few denials at
the periphery of conventional medical practice involving fairly
modest sums. The medical establishment was largely unaffected,
health insurance was still sold profitably, and most employers were
generally unconcerned about the cost of employee health bene-
fits.
45
4 S A substantial and increasing minority of courts, though, have held that the sole
province to determine coverage does not lie with the attending physician and that
insurers have a proper role in determining medical necessity. See infra notes 115 &
143.
44 In the rare instances where this position is considered as an explicit public
policy prohibition, its striking weaknesses are readily revealed. Consider the cogent
critique by one court of an argument by a group of psychiatrists that they should not
be bound by a health plan's requirement of prior approval for coverage of mental
health services:
[T]hese psychiatrists have joined this Plan. Having sought to be members
and contractually agreed to be members, how can they now be heard to
challenge the provisions to which they agreed? How can they voluntarily
enter a contract and then challenge its terms? And if challenged, why would
the contract not simply be void? How can plaintiffs challenge only the
provisions they do not like and ask the Court, in effect, to modify the
contract to their liking? Plaintiffs do not address this.
But the most persuasive argument against the plaintiffs, it seems to me,
is ... [that the] [p]laintiffs say, in effect, "Irrespective of any obligation I
have to my patients and to my profession, my judgment as to what is in the
best interests of my patients will not be determined by the exercise of my
medical judgment, but by how much I will be paid for my services."
Plaintiffs are saying in effect, "Since I am weak in my resolve to afford
proper treatment, [the insurer's] preauthorization program would induce
me to breach my ethical and legal duties, and the Court must protect me
from my own weakness." In other words, protect me from my own
misconduct. This is strange stuff indeed from which to fashion a legal
argument.
Varol v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 708 F. Supp. 826, 833 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
45 See Harvey M. Sapolsky et al., Corporate Attitudes Toward Health Care Costs, 59
MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 561, 561-85 (1981) (describing the lack of concern by
companies over the cost of health benefit programs). The federal government was
more concerned about the cost of its health care programs, but most of the
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These idyllic times have ended. During the 1980s, a number of
studies questioned the appropriateness of many of the procedures
commonly ordered by physicians.4 6  Other studies found wide
variations in hospital admission rates across geographic areas that
could not be explained by demography, health status, economic
status, or other relevant factors.4 7 The general consensus of the
researchers was that much of the variation in medical practice could
only be explained by a discretionary "medical practice factor."
48
These studies encouraged insurers to begin reviewing the appropri-
ateness of medical procedures more closely and in advance of
treatment, a technique know as "prospective utilization review."
Both prospective and retrospective utilization review gained
momentum in the 1980s for several other reasons. When Congress
government's emphasis was on controlling the prices paid for specific services and not
questioning the individual decisions made by physicians. See KAREN DAVIS ET AL.,
HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT 104-29 (1990).
46 See, e.g., Rolla Edward Park et al., Physician Ratings of Appropriate Indications for
Three Procedures: Theoretical Indications vs. Indications Used in Practice, 79 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 445 (1989). In this study, a panel of physicians judged that 17.3% of
coronary angiographies, 10.5% ofendoscopies, and 28.5% of carotid endarterectomies
actually performed were clearly inappropriate. See id. at 446-47.4 7 See, e.g.,John E. Wennberg et al., Are Hospital Services Rationed in New Haven or
Over-Utilised in Boston?, LANCET, May 23, 1987, at 1185,1185-88. A number of studies
have found that hospitalization rates vary across geographic areas even when those
areas have similar demographic characteristics. Physicians in Boston were found
more likely to admit patients for 'medical and minor surgical ills" than were their
counterparts in New Haven. See id. at 1187. In the case of major surgery the
variation was notas consistent; for some procedures (carotid endarterectomy and hip
and knee replacement) rates were higher in Boston while for others (coronary bypass,
thyroidectomy, excision of intervertebral disc, cholecystectomy, hysterectomy,
extended simple/radical mastectomy, and splenectomy) the rates were higher in New
Haven. See id. at 1187-88. Procedures with low discretion in decisions to admit are
more closely correlated to incidence rates in an area than are high discretion
procedures. See id. at 1185. The fact that Boston hospitals are more likely to admit
patients for more discretionary procedures does not seem to be reflected in the
occupancy rates of the hospitals, which were approximately equal in the two areas.
See id. at 1186.
Because of the nature of mortality statistics, it is not possible to come to a
definitive conclusion as to which area's practice patterns are more effective. The one
concrete result of the differences is that Medicare reimbursements in Boston are
almost twice that in New Haven. See John E. Wennberg et al., Hospital Use and
Mortality AmongMedicare Beneficiaries in Boston and New Haven, 321 NEW ENG.J. MED.
1168, 1168-73 (1989).
48 See ROLLA E. PARK ET AL., PHYSICIAN RATINGS OF APPROPRIATE INDICATIONS
FOR SIX MEDICAL AND SURGICAL PROCEDURES 24 (1986) (tentatively concluding that
"there really is disagreement about the value of these procedures for many
indications, and that the disagreement reflects the lack of detailed evidence about the
circumstances in which these procedures are efficacious").
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changed the system for paying hospitals under the Medicare
program in 1983, it established Peer Review Organizations (PROs)
to monitor the appropriateness and quality of medical care provided
to Medicare beneficiaries. 49 At about the same time, large private
employers began to self-insure and implement their own screening
criteria for medical effectiveness. 50 Private insurers, attempting to
maintain market share by demonstrating that they could control
health care costs, also began instituting prospective utilization
review programs. Suddenly, from all directions, physicians
experienced much greater scrutiny of their treatment decisions than
ever before.
51
As the utilization review programs evolved, a significant
difference emerged between the public and private sector programs.
The public sector continued the retrospective review of claims,
allowing the denial of payment after the service was performed.
The private sector, responding to the courts' concern over the
perceived unfairness of retroactive denials, 52 instituted prospective
review wherever possible. 53 Under prospective utilization review,
the determination of medical necessity is made prior to treatment.
Various methods for prospective utilization review quickly emerged
from the usually sluggish indemnity market,5 4 testifying to the
strength of the competitive pressures placed on insurers by
employers faced with skyrocketing health insurance costs. For
example, from 1984 to 1988, the proportion of conventional
49 See DAvIs ET AL., supra note 45, at 50; see also Gerard F. Anderson & Earl P.
Steinberg, Hospital Readmissions in the Medicare Population, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1349, 1353 (1984) (suggesting that PROs monitor readmissions as well as general
hospital programs).
o The number of employees working for self-insured firms doubled from 21% to
42% between 1981 and 1985. See Gail A. Jensen & Jon R. Gabel, The Erosion of
Purchased Health Insurance, 25 INQUIRY 328, 333 (1988).
51 See EvanJ. Ellman, Monitor Mania: Physicians Regulation Run Amok!, 20 LOY.
U. CM. LJ. 721 (1989).
52 As with prior insurer innovations, this change was urged by the courts. See, e.g.,
Van Vactor v. Blue Cross Ass'n, 365 N.E.2d 638, 644 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (stating that
insurer may not determine medical necessity because "there is no mechanism by
which the insured can ascertain in advance how such a determination will be made
and whether or not he will be covered for a specific treatment or hospitalization");
Myerson v. Associated Hosp. Serv., 314 N.Y.S.2d 834, 836 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968) ("It
would be a different situation if [the patient] were aware from the very beginning that
he was primarily [receiving excluded services].").
55 Prospective review is not possible, for example, in emergency cases.
' These techniques include pre-admission certification, concurrent review of
hospitalization length of stay, second opinion requirements for surgical procedures,
and high-cost case management.
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indemnity insurance that employed pre-admission certification, a
form of prospective review, increased from five to seventy-three
percent.55
A typical precertification review system operates as follows. The
insurance contract requires the subscriber or physician, except in
emergencies, to obtain permission before entering the hospital or
undergoing certain expensive outpatient procedures. 56  The
treatment request is usually reviewed initially by a computer
algorithm that flags certain requests for further clinical review.
5 7
Then a nurse, applying fairly rudimentary screening criteria, reviews
these cases to determine which ones require further physician
review.58  Physician reviewers, who rely on published studies of
medical effectiveness as well as their own clinical experience, then
apply their independent judgment of medical appropriateness,
usually after consulting with the treating physician in cases of
disagreement.59 In most such cases, the two doctors reach some
accord; the overall percentage of denied requests is only one to two
percent.
6 0
2. Judicial Enforcement of Prospective Review
Prospective review was intended to alleviate the perceived
unfairness of retroactive denials of coverage.6 1 Instead of having
this effect, however, prospective review creates in the minds of some
judges a heightened sense of hardship since providers demand a
source of payment before undertaking treatment. As one court
explained: "A mistaken conclusion about medical necessity
following retrospective review will result in the wrongful withhold-
ing of payment. An erroneous decision in a prospective review
55 
See CHARLES EBY ET AL., A BRIEF HISTORY OF HEALTH CARE COST CONTAIN-
MENT 5 (Health Ins. Ass'n of Am. ed., 1991) (survey of HIAA members).
56 See INsTIuTE OF MEDICINE, CONTROLLING COSTS AND CHANGING PATIENT
CARE? THE ROLE OF UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT 3, 17-18, 66 (Bradford H. Gray &
Marilyn J. Field eds., 1989) [hereinafter INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CONTROLLING
COSTS].
57 See id. at 71.
58 See id. at 71-73.
-9 See id. at 73-77.
60 See id. at 4, 77.
61 See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. For instance, sharp criticism has
been leveled against the Medicare rule that coverage decisions may not be challenged
until the treatment has been rendered and a bill submitted for payment. The
Supreme Court acknowledged the rule in Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 621-22
(1984), over a dissenting opinion criticizing its harshness.
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process, on the other hand, in practical consequences, results in the
withholding of necessary care, potentially leading to a patient's
permanent disability or death." 62 In cases of terminal illness,
courts often assume the worst-case, life-or-death scenario prior to
treatment: that the patient will certainly die without the requested
treatment and that the treatment will definitely save the patient's
life.63 These extreme assumptions, coupled with the payment
demands of providers, force most courts to confront these cases in
a preliminary injunction context. This legal posture requires the
court to balance the equities between the parties in a manner that
inevitably favors avoiding the possible loss of life over the insurers'
monetary loss.
64
Viewing the choice from this perspective, it is not surprising that
insurers continue to lose despite extremely attenuated grounds for
coverage. For instance, in Bradley v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue
Shield65 the court enjoined Blue Cross from classifying ABMT
treatment for an HIV-positive patient as experimental. 66  The
62 Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 812 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
63 Cf. Zuckerberg v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 464 N.Y.S.2d 678 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.),
rev'd on other grounds, 487 N.Y.S.2d 595 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985), aff'd, 490 N.E.2d 839
(N.Y. 1986). In Zuckerberg, the court ordered the insurer to pay for cancer treatment
received in Mexico, which consisted of organically grown fruits and vegetables and
certain medications and vitamins. The court quotedJohn Greenleaf Whittier's poem
Maud Miller when it wrote: "A possible path was opened, had it not been taken, what
then? At least, it was tried. 'For of all sad words of tongue or pen, The saddest are
these: "It might have been!"" Id. at 683.
64 See e.g., Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 131, 140 (D.N.J. 1989)
("Weighing the various equities presents no difficulties.... Failure to provide
treatment will probably result in death in a matter of months."). Interestingly, the
courts rarely appear to consider placing some or all of the risk of monetary loss on
the providers that insist on the procedure's efficacy.
562 N.Y.S.2d 908 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990).
66 In addition to Bradley, the court in Dozsa, 716 F.Supp. 131, issued a preliminary
injunction preventing the insurer from denying coverage for an ABMT treatment.
See id. at 140. The court found that the procedure was not experimental, despite the
following exhaustive consideration that revealed many explicit references to its
"investigational" status:
Dr. Plocher [the insurer's medical director] and his associates analyzed peer
review medical literature on the subject; he reviewed the procedure with
outstanding experts in the pertinent specialty field; he went to independent
organizations of technology assessment; he submitted a proposal for
coverage to 90 or more Prudential medical directors and other persons in
the field for their comments. Thereafter the question of coverage of ABMT
procedures was presented for a final decision to Prudential's headquarters
vice-presidents for claims, marketing, law, underwriting and contract.
Id. at 135. When the particular claim came in for this patient, Dr. Plocher also
"sought the advice of an outside expert," who wrote: "'I do not think ABMT for
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court found Blue Cross likely to lose on the merits, despite evidence
that the patient's doctor was the only physician in the country who
had ever employed this treatment and despite the patient's signing
of a "clinical investigation consent form" that "emphasize[d] the
research aspect of the procedure."67 Almost by definition, treat-
ment subject to certain forms of clinical investigation must be
considered of unproven effectiveness. Before patients are randomly
selected to participate in the non-treatment arm of the study, ethical
requirements demand that an independent, broadly composed
"human subjects research review board" (also called an "institutional
review board" or "IRB") determine there to be as good a chance
that the therapy will hurt the patient as help. 68  In Bradley, the
court found the procedure non-experimental even though the level
of confidence had not even progressed to this preliminary "coin-
toss" stage of confidence.
69
relapsing multiple myeloma can be considered anything other than investigational at
the present time.'" Id. at 136 (quoting the expert). The court was unpersuaded by
this because it was phrased as "investigational" rather than "experimental." See id. at
136-38. Two doctors, however, testified that the procedure was commonly recognized
as an appropriate treatment for multiple myeloma. See id. at 138-39.
In contrast, the basis for decision is more substantial in Rollo v. Blue Cross/Blue
Shield, No. 90-597, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5376 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 1990). See supra text
accompanying notes 1-3.
67 Bradley, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 910. The court denigrated the consent form as "the
bar's contribution to the defense of potential medical malpractice litigation,"
concluded that it did not accurately describe the nature of the treatment, and gave
it little weight. Id. It is interesting that the court attributed the consent form to a
hypersensitive bar rather than characterizing it as an honest response to the
judiciary's own development of the informed consent doctrine. See also Pirozzi v.
Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 741 F. Supp. 586,593-94 (E.D. Va. 1990) (finding ABMT for
breast cancer covered despite explicit research protocol and the fact that it is still
being subjected to randomized clinical trials elsewhere).
6 See Benjamin Freedman, Equipoise and the Ethics of Clinical Research, 317 NEw
ENG.J. MED. 141, 141 (1987) ("The ethics of clinical research requires equipoise-a
state of genuine uncertainty on the part of the clinical investigator regarding the
comparative therapeutic merits of each .;rm in a trial."); Eric Kodish et al., Ethical
Considerations in Randomized Controlled Clinical Trials, 65 CANcER 2400, 2400-01
(1990) ("The IRB[s] evaluate ... whether proposed research satisfies equipoise
conditions, i.e., whether the scientific data show that there is real uncertainty about
which arm of the protocol is likely to result in better patient outcomes .... ").
69 In clinical research jargon, the procedure had been subjected to only Phase I
studies. Randomized controlled trials constitute Phase II.
After the Bradley decision, the National Cancer Institute (NCI) announced that
it would conduct randomized clinical trials for women with metastatic breast cancer
undergoing ABMT. See Suplee, supra note 13, at 1. This event verifies the
experimental status of ABMT even for more conventional uses; the NCI will sanction
randomized clinical trials only if the procedure is experimental and the medical
efficacy of the procedure has not been demonstrated. Such trials still have not been
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In summary, insurance coverage disputes have evolved through
three cycles of litigation, each one characterized by the courts'
unwillingness to accept and enforce the very contractual terms
suggested in the prior stage. Courts continually fail to see beyond
the heart-rending facts of the immediate case to the reality that the
present strained ruling in favor of coverage will be applied by other
courts even if the contract is revised in the suggested manner.
Consequently, the parties to the health insurance contract are
frequently precluded from enforcing the terms they have chosen to
define the limits of coverage. The following section explores the
impact of judicial interference in the health insurance market.
C. The Social Cost and Deterrent Effect
of the Courts' Decisions
While it is easy to understand why ajudge would do everything
possible to find coverage in a life-threatening situation, this visceral
response ignores the long-term implications of inhibiting insurers
from questioning treating physicians' decisions.
1. Pricing Policyholders Out of the Market
The judicial inclination to find all conceivable grounds for
coverage imposes considerable costs on policyholders beyond the
mere price of the treatment in the litigated cases. One cost is the
deterrent effect these rulings have on insurers' cost containment
efforts. A series of negative decisions is likely to convince insurers
to extend coverage in all similar cases, even though the subscribers
may not have desired to pay for this additional coverage at the
outset. In effect, courts are mandating coverage that informed
consumers in the private marketplace would have chosen not to
purchase, a phenomenon known as "judge-made insurance."
70
Like legislatively mandated insurance,71 judge-made insurance has
an associated cost.72 It increases the price of health insurance for
approved for ABMT's application to AIDS patients.70 See Kenneth S. Abraham,Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring
the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151 passim (1981).
71 See Jon R. Gabel & Gail A. Jensen, The Price of State Mandated Benefits, 26
INQUIRY 419 (1989) (analyzing the effects of state-mandated insurance on the cost of
insurance, the offering of insurance by small employers, and self-insurance by large
employers).
72 See Abraham, supra note 70, at 1188 ("Any increase in a policy's package of
insurance protection will often increase its price .... [Slome people will choose not
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everyone, which forces some consumers at the margin out of the
health insurance market altogether.
73
Even if an insurer continues to deny certain claims, the expense
and uncertainty of litigation impose considerable additional costs on
the insurance product. 74 The expense of litigation is self-evident.
The uncertainty component results from the unpredictability of how
courts will interpret contractual terms. Insurers must either include
this additional uncertainty of judicial interpretation in their risk
calculations when pricing the insurance product, or they must write
their coverage in a less desirable fashion to achieve the degree of
predictability necessary to price the insurance product accurate-
ly. 75 Thus, refusing to honor the plain meaning of insurance
contracts results in consumers being unable to purchase the scope
of insurance coverage they desire.
76
2. The Deterrent Effect on Cost Containment Efforts
Another social cost of these rulings is that they deter insurers
from assuming a more aggressive role in containing health care
costs. The difficulty of enforcing payment denials for inappropriate
care has made insurers notoriously submissive in applying medical
appropriateness standards. 77 Until recently, insurers have been
willing to defend their denials of coverage only at the outer
extremes of medical practice. Even with their current greater
resolve, insurers deny only one to two percent of claims reviewed
under prospective utilization review,78 despite the growing body
to buy it at all-the increase in cost.., will have priced them out of the market.").
73 Thus, the most thorough analysis to date of the cost of statutorily mandated
coverage concluded that "nearly one of every six small firms that do not offer health
insurance would in an essentially [legislatively] mandate-free environment." See Gabel
& Jensen, supra note 71, at 428. It is reasonable to infer that judicially mandated
insurance imposes at least an equal cost.
74 Cf. Abraham, supra note 70, at 1192 ("Balancing the equities between parties
to an insurance contract is an acceptable judicial function. That function, however,
cannot be pursued liberally without sacrificing the certainty and predictability
afforded by written policies of insurance.").
75 For a more detailed discussion of contracting alternatives, see infra text
accompanying notes 171-212.
76 Peter Huber writes: "Take away contract and there is nothing left to insurance;
either bargains of this sort are enforceable on their own mutually understood and
accepted terms, or they will not be written at all." PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE
LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 149 (1988).
77 See supra text accompanying note 20; infra text accompanying notes 96 & 112.
7 8 See supra text accompanying note 60.
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of literature suggesting that a much greater portion of the proce-
dures currently being covered are inappropriate.
79
These rulings have also deterred insurers from choosing the
criteria to assess medical appropriateness. The medical technology
assessment literature identifies three levels of evaluation for medical
procedures, drugs, and devices. They can be found (1) safe and
efficacious, (2) cost effective, and/or (3) cost beneficial. The first
level, which is employed by the Food and Drug Administration to
evaluate all new drugs and devices, asks only whether the procedure
is safe and provides some medical benefit, however small.80 The
second level asks whether this medical benefit is superior to what
can be achieved by other procedures at equal or lesser cost. Only
the third level asks whether a net increase in medical benefit is
worth the cost.
81
Health insurers have historically operated only at the first level,
seeking to justify their coverage denials primarily as a means to
protect patients from harmful or fraudulent care.82 They have not
even asked whether a beneficial therapy might be more cheaply
79 See PEPPER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 40-41; supra notes 46-48.
8 0 This evaluation is usually performed through randomized clinical trials. See
David A. Kessler etal., The Federal Regulation ofMedicalDevices, 317 NEW ENG.J. MED.
357, 359 (1987). The Food and Drug Administration does not review medical
procedures such as new surgical techniques and does not require clinical trials for all
possible uses of a drug or device, only the uses indicated in the sales literature. See
id. at 359 (stating that "[s]afety and effectiveness are assessed with special reference
to the uses for which the device is intended, as set forth in the labeling on the
device").
8 1 See COMMTTEE FOR EVALUATING MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, INST. OF MEDICINE,
ASSESSING MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 136-40 (1985) [hereinafter ASSESSING MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGIES]; Maxwell J. Mehlman, Health Care Cost Containment and Medical
Technology: A Critique of Waste Theoiy, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 778, 784-94 (1986)
(comparing three different concepts of "waste," the first considering only the effect
of the technology on the patient, the second incorporating the cost of the technology,
and the third converting patient benefits into dollars so that benefits can be
compared with the cost of the treatment).
See Zuckerberg v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 487 N.Y.S.2d 595, 600 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1985), aff'd, 490 N.E.2d 839 (N.Y. 1986) (approving insurer's denial of coverage
for nutritional therapy treatment of cancer and stating that the denial would have
"the desirable effect of affording greater protection to... patients who are especially
vulnerable to unfounded claims of miraculous cures"). Perhaps the patronizing
nature of this justification explains why courts have rejected it so consistently. Except
in the most obvious cases of quackery, it stands to reason that insurers should defer
to patients' and doctors' own decisions about whether a treatment is safe. Therefore,
insurers might fare better in court if they used a less disingenuous justification, that
is, if they defended primarily on the basis of cost effectiveness, or even granting cost
effectiveness, on the basis of uninsurability. See infra text accompanying notes 156-58.
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performed without sacrificing any benefit, let alone whether a
marginally increased benefit is simply too expensive to be worth-
while. They have asked only that some medical benefit be demon-
strated, leaving the choice of less versus more effective and less
versus more expensive modalities to the doctor and patient.
8 3
Even with this extreme trepidation, they consistently lose in court.
Although insurers are considering incorporating cost in their
assessment of medical effectiveness,8 4 this means only that they
might move to the second tier of assessment, not that they are
taking on the much more controversial role of paying for services
only if the benefits exceed the costs.8 5 Whether they can make
83 For instance, the five criteria that the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association
use in making its technology assessment recommendations to its constituent plans ask
only whether the technology improves net health outcomes equal to the alternatives.
They contain no consideration of whether equally effective alternatives are less costly
or whether the incremental increase in net health outcomes is justified by the
additional costs. See Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 741 F. Supp. 586,590-91 (E.D.
Va. 1990); see also Kalb, supra note 15, at 1115-16 ("[P]rivate insurers virtually never
consider the costs of a technology when determining whether it is reasonable or
necessary... Specifically, private insurers have not attempted to contain costs by
systematically excluding wasteful technologies from coverage.").
84 See Miller, supra note 16, at 335-36 ("Third-party payors are attempting to focus
more on the cost effectiveness of new procedures and reviewing general cost/benefit
principles on which to evaluate the effect of one procedure as an alternative to other
surgical or medical procedures."); cf. Glenn Kramon, Medical Second-Guessing-in
Advance, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 24, 1991, at D12 ("Insurers say the day is coming when
denial of payment will be far more common."). On the Medicare proposal to
incorporate cost considerations into coverage decisions, see Medicare Program;
Criteria and Procedures for Making Medical Services Coverage Decisions that Relate
to Health Care Technology, 54 Fed. Reg. 4302, 4308-10 (1989) (codified at 42 C.F.R.
pts. 400, 405). See also Robert Pear, Medicare to Weigh Cost as a Factor in Reimburse-
ment: Fundamental U.S. Shift, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1991, at Al (reporting on a
confidential draft of the new Medicare rules awaiting clearance).
85 An Institute of Medicine committee stated:
At this time, the committee does not see utilization management moving
toward intentional rationing of clinically necessary medical services....
Nurse and physician reviewers do not make explicit case-by-case assessments
of whether the expected clinical benefits of a hospital admission or other
proposed service for a specific patient are, in some way, worth not only the
clinical risks but also the economic costs.
INsTrrTUTE OF MEDICINE, CONTROLLING COSTS, supra note 56, at 148. Whether
insurers, or anyone else, should make health care rationing decisions is a very
controversial topic. See MaxwellJ. Mehlman, Rationing Expensive Lifesaving Medical
Treatments, 1985 WIs. L. REV. 239, 301-03 (arguing against the use of cost/benefit
criteria). It suffices for the present discussion to observe: (1) someone must make
rationing decisions for health care dollars to be spent wisely, see Clark C. Havighurst
& James F. Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-Offs in Medical Care: The Role
of PSROs, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 6,6-20 (1975); William B. Schwartz, The Inevitable Failure
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even this modest move depends, of course, on how successful they
have been in the first tier. Since insurers have been remarkably
unsuccessful, it is certain that their cost containment efforts will
continue to be cautious at best.
This deterrent effect is heightened by the extraordinary
penalties that carL attach to payment denials the courts find to be
erroneous. Through reasoning unprecedented in other areas of law,
courts have imported elements of tort law into these contractual
disputes by imposing punitive damages on insurers for breaches of
contract found to be in bad faith,8 6 while at the same time, lower-
ing the ordinary tort standards for determining when allegations of
bad faith may be presented to the jury.8 7 Insurers may now face
malpractice liability when their prospective coverage denials are
followed by a deterioration in the patient's condition, or even by the
patient's failure to improve.88 Although the Employee Retirement
of Current Cost-Containment Strategies, 257 JAMA 220, 223 (1987); and (2) some
rational consumers might decide that their insurers are in the best position to make
these decisions, as HMOs are thought to do. Thus, we are not entertaining the
strong argument that indemnity insurers should or must be rationing agents. We
suggest only that the law should not foreclose this option if a significant number of
purchasers desire it. We repeat, however, that at present the issue is two steps
removed from this more controversial stage because insurers are bogged down in the
first level of assessment, namely, basic safety and effectiveness.
8 6 See Joanne B. Stern, Bad Faith Suits: Are They Applicable to Health Maintenance
Organizations?, 85 W. VA. L. REV. 911, 913-20 (1983) (reviewing the law on bad faith
claims).
87 For example, in Taylor v. Prudential Ins. Co., 775 F.2d 1457, 1459 (11th Cir.
1985), the court reversed a summary judgment granted to an insurer on a bad faith
claim even though it relied on Medicare's determination that no continued
hospitalization was medically necessary. In Hughes v. Blue Cross, 263 Cal. Rptr. 850,
852, 855-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989), the court affirmed an award of $700,000 in punitive
damages for the insurer's use of only the physician's orders, progress notes, and
nursing notes in denying coverage, despite the insurer's repeated requests to the
patient and physician to forward all relevant documents. In Aetna Life Insurance
Company v. Lavoie, 505 So. 2d 1050, 1051 & n.1 (Ala. 1987) (per curiam), the jury
awarded $3,500,000 in punitive damages (reduced to $500,000 on appeal) on a claim
of only $1650, even though the insurer based its decisions on the type of documents
that were missing in Hughes-the admitting sheet, admission history and physical,
discharge summary and, lab reports. The insurer initially failed to consider the
nursing notes and progress notes. It later corrected this mistake, but the court ruled
that "the insurance company cannot later seek to justify its denial by gathering
information which it should have had in the first place. '[A]n insured purchases
insurance and not an unjustified court battle when he enters into the insurance
contract.'" Id. at 1053 (alteration in original) (quoting Gulf Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v.
Barnes, 405 So. 2d 916, 925 (Ala. 1981)).
88 See Wilson v. Blue Cross, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 883-85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990);
Hershey, supra note 19, at 62-63.
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Income Security Act (ERISA)89 may preempt much of this law,
leaving plaintiffs primarily to their contract measure of compensa-
tion,9° ERISA also has a penal element allowing the plaintiffs
court costs and attorney fees to be imposed on the insurer.
Moreover, now that utilization review is occurring on a prospective
basis, the consequential damages that are available from a breach of
contract remedy likely could include the same measure of harm
present in a tort action.
9 1
Because the courts reflect the attitude of society generally,
92
this description of the case law and its consequences is not intended
to argue that these rulings lack popular support. We only observe
that these extreme rulings impose costs that courts frequently
ignore. If insurers must fully litigate each coverage decision in each
jurisdiction under the wording of each plan for each employer, they
will continue to be relegated to a role of writing blank checks to the
medical profession. As a result, the courts, rightly or wrongly,
impose considerable private and social costs by deterring insurers
from assuming a more active role in slowing the diffusion of
medical technologies that are not efficacious, cost effective or cost
beneficial. The following section analyzes more systematically
whether these rulings serve goals worth the sacrifices or whether
they instead subvert broader public policy objectives.
89 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
90 See Blum, supra note 19, at 210. It was once taken as established that punitive
damages were unavailable under ERISA. The Supreme Court's recent decision in
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. 478, 486 (1990), suggesting that federal
courts retain inherent authority to award such damages, casts the issue in some
doubt, however. Compare Haywood v. Russell Corp., 584 So. 2d 1291 (Ala. 1991)
(holding punitive damages are available under ERISA) with Gaskell v. Harvard Coop.
Soc'y, 762 F. Supp. 1539 (D. Mass. 1991) (holding to the contrary, despite Ingersoll-
Rand).
91 Cf. Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 883 (alleging that contract breach caused patient's
suicide).
92 See David G. Barnum, The Supreme Court and Public Opinion: Judicial Decision
Making in the Post-New Deal Period, 47J. POL. 652 (1985).
ASSESSMENT OF MEDICAL NECESSITY
11. SHOULD INSURERS DETERMINE MEDICAL APPROPRIATENESS?
A. A New Role For Insurers
Until the mid-1970s the primary health policy objective was to
expand health care services. By adopting professional norms to
govern coverage decisions, the insurance industry was conducive to
this developmental era. This harmonious, expansionary attitude
continued when the Medicare and Medicaid programs were enacted
in 1965.93 Some time in the mid-197Os, however, the emphasis
shifted towards controlling health care costs.9 4 Concerns over
improving access to health insurance for the uninsured, expanding
coverage to the marginally insured, and providing long-term-care
coverage have been put on hold until health care costs can be
brought under control.95 In this new environment, the failure of
insurers to take a more aggressive role in questioning medical
practices has led to the criticism that they are not using their
tremendous market power to control health care costs and to
reduce inappropriate medical care.
96
Cost containment became a policy objective for several reasons.
Policymakers within state and the federal governments saw the
portion of their budget going for medical services increase rapidly,
constraining their ability to fund other programs.97 Corporate
executives grew concerned that high health care costs were harming
93 In her book, Medicare: The Politics of Federal HospitalInsurance,Judith M. Feder
details how the federal government was forced to adopt the same insurance system
provided in the private sector in order to avoid a boycott by the hospital industry and
the medical profession. SeeJUDrrIH M. FEDER, MEDICARE: THE POLmcs OF FEDERAL
HOSPITAL INSURANCE 143-56 (1977).
94 See DAVIS ET AL., supra note 45, at 10-32, 108-28 (detailing the various public
and private cost containment initiatives that have been used in the United States).
95 See id.
96 The leading critic is Professor Havighurst, who has characterized insurers' cost
containment record as a "tacit conspiracy... policed by organized medicine." Clark
C. Havighurst & Glenn M. Hackbarth, Private Cost Containment, 300 NEw ENG.J. MED.
1298, 1299 (1979); see also Clark C. Havighurst, The Questionable Cost-Containment
Record of Commercial Health Insurers, in HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF HosPrrALs AND HEALTH INSURANCE 221, 254 (H.E. Frech ed., 1988)
(noting that "commercial carriers appeared for a long time to be nearly useless in
combating the influence of moral hazard on the cost of insured health services");
Havighurst, supra note 20, at 338 (stating that "[flor a long time, the insurers made
a positive virtue of noninterference in professional decisions").
97 See Robert Pear, Medicare Prognosis: Unwieldy Growth Fueled by More Fees and
Beneficiaries, N.Y. TIMES, March 10, 1991, § 4, at 4 (noting that Medicare is "the
fastest-growing major program in the Federal budget").
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their international competitiveness.9" As governments and private
industry attempted to control costs by imposing cost sharing, the
consumer became more aware of the cost of health care. Unions
now frequently strike in response to corporate proposals to increase
the level of cost sharing.9 9 All of this is occurring within the
backdrop of health services research findings that a significant
portion of medical care is inappropriate and is delivered in widely
varying patterns that cannot be explained by variations in health
status or other factors.
100
According to most observers, a driving force behind the increase
in health care spending is new technology. 10 ' While there have
been attempts to control new technology through regulations, such
as certificate of need controls 10 2 and hospital payment re-
form,10 3 the growing consensus is that more rigorous assessments
of the actual health outcomes of alternative treatment modalities
will also be an effective mechanism for eliminating unnecessary or
inappropriate medical procedures.10 4  The federal government
established a new federal agency, the Agency for Health Care Policy
and Research, with a mandate to conduct medical effectiveness
studies and issue detailed practice guidelines. 0 5 It is anticipated
that the results will be used to inform physicians and patients about
appropriate medical care and to assist public and private insurers in
developing coverage policy.1
0 6
98 See Uwe E. Reinhardt, Health Care Spending and American Competitiveness,
HEALTH AFF., Winter 1989, at 5, 5-21 (describing the general perception among
business and union executives that health care costs are driving up the cost of doing
business in the United States, but disputing the factual basis for this impression).
" See Louis Uchitelle, Insurance Linked to Jobs: System Showing its Age, N.Y. TIMES,
May 1, 1991, at Al, D23 ("The A.F.L.-C.I.O. estimates that three-fourths of the days
lost to strikes in 1989 involved disputes over health care [benefits].").
100 See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
101 See Stuart Altman & Robert Blendon, Introduction to MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES:
THE CuLPRIT BEHIND HEALTH CAPE CosTs? 1, 1-2 (1979) (Proceedings of the Sun
Valley Forum on National Health, available through the U.S. Government Printing
Office); Gerard Anderson & Earl Steinberg, To Buy or Not to Buy: Technology
Acquisition Under Prospective Payment, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 182, 182-185 (1984);
Schwartz, supra note 85, at 222-23.
102 See David Salkever & David Bice, The Impact of Certificate-of-Need Controls on
Hospital Investment, HEALTH & Soc'Y, Spring 1976, at 185, 185-88.
103 See Anderson & Steinberg, supra note 101, at 182.
104 See William L. Roper et al., Effectiveness in Health Care: An Initiative to Evaluate
and Improve Medical Practice, 319 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1197, 1198-99 (1988).
105 See 42 U.S.C. § 299 (1988).
106 See Linda J. White & John Ball, Integrating Practice Guidelines with Financial
Incentives, 16 QUALrrY REV. BULL. 50, 51-52 (1990).
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The need for this activity is ever more urgent in light of the
relentless pace of medical advances. Biotechnology products such
as erythropoietin and interferon are rapidly becoming available,
with a huge potential market and an enormous total price tag.
107
In the future, an unforetold range of genetic therapies is likely to
become available 08 at a potentially extraordinary additional cost.
Often these new technologies are provided in addition to, not as
substitutes for, existing technologies. 10 9 To use these new tech-
nologies wisely, it will be necessary to determine when they are the
most cost effective. Unfortunately, none of the existing regulatory
processes such as Food and Drug Administration approval mandate
such an analysis.110 Therefore, public and private insurers are the
most likely institutions to mandate a rigorous evaluation of the
appropriateness of new medical products.'
Many independent observers view insurers' review of medical*
appropriateness as a positive development." 2 Insurers can use
their data and direct contact with consumers to design a contract
that reflects a tradeoff between price and the scope of covered
services. Insurers are situated to make these welfare-optimizing
decisions because they operate in a marketplace that penalizes them
for failing to balance the customers' desire for cost containment
with the desire for access to necessary medical services. Their old
role of reinforcing the professional preferences of medical providers
has been replaced by a new role that expresses the view of consum-
ers in the marketplace."
3
107 See Rhonda L. Rundle, AMGEN Cleared to Sell Kidney Patient Drug Still Faces
Big Hurdles, WALL ST. J., June 2, 1989, at Al.
108 See Denis Cournoyer & C. Thomas Caskey, Gene Transfer into Humans: A First
Step, 323 NEw ENG.J. MED. 601, 601 (1990).
109 See Anderson & Steinberg, supra note 101, at 184.
110 See supra text accompanying note 80.
I" Cf Susan Foote, Assessing Medical Technology Assessment: Past; Present, and
Future, 65 MILBANK Q. 59, 62-72 (1987) (describing the difficulty the federal
government faces in conducting technology assessments).
112 See Kalb, supra note 15, at 1119 ("Limiting insurance coverage to those
technologies that have been demonstrated to be safe, effective, and cost-effective
would enhance social welfare by making adequate health insurance less expensive and
more accessible."); see also ASSESSING MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 81, at 11
("Decisions about payment for medical care should be based on more than safety,
efficacy, and research status of the care."); id. at 213 ("The authority to apply
reimbursement sanctions to implement the findings of assessment, even if quality is
at stake, must be clearly spelled out in the law."); id. at 223 ("Reimbursement offered,
or withheld, is a prime tool for the enforcement of socially necessary decisions.").
113 See generally Clark C. Havighurst, Decentralizing Decision Making: Private
Contract Versus Professional Norms, in MARKET REFORMS IN HEALTH CARE 22 (Jack A.
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B. Objections to Insurers' New Role
While there may be agreement in the abstract that insurers
should be given a larger role in determining medical appropriate-
ness, 114 there is considerable disagreement over what that role
should be. Specifically, can insurers be trusted to make decisions
in their subscribers' best interest? The two principal objections to
insurers reviewing medical appropriateness are (1) that, by virtue of
their proprietary interest in the premiums they have already
collected, insurers have a conflict of interest that precludes them
from making a neutral, unbiased decision; and (2) they lack the
knowledge and expertise to make medical treatment decisions
wisely. In the following sections we discuss the merits of these
objections.
1. Competing Conflicts of Interest
a. Physicians' Conflict of Interest
One reason subscribers may want to give their insurers authority
to review their doctors' determinations of medical necessity is that,
otherwise, doctors enjoy an unconstrained ability to determine their
own payments, with obvious consequences for the price of the
insurance product.1 1 5 Imagine what our food bills would be if we
Meyer ed., 1983) (advocating consumer choice over professionally defined norms).
14 The major exception comes from those who stand to lose as a result. See
Gerald W. Grumet, H-ealth Care Rationing Through Inconvenience: The Third Party's
Secret Weapon, 321 NEW ENG.J. MED. 607 (1989). Grumet, a physician, rails against
.managed care's arsenal of cost-control weaponry" that
supersede the physician's autonomyby a managerial-review process in which
armies of claims clerks, administrators, auditors, form processors, peer
reviewers, functionaries, and technocrats of every description insinuate
themselves into a complex system that authorizes, delivers, and pays for
medical service.
Id. at 608. It is noteworthy that the prime focus of this polemic is Medicare and
Medicaid, which are not subject to the forces of market discipline that we argue serve
to keep private utilization review in proper balance. See infra text accompanying
notes 168-70. Also, insurer review is obviously opposed by patients at the time they
are sick. As we develop below, however, the proper perspective on this policy
question is the perspective of subscribers at the time they purchase their insurance.
See infra text accompanying notes 150-53. Thus, a Louis Harris poll found that 57%
of the public viewed prospective utilization review to be acceptable, as opposed to
41% of doctors. See ANNE STOLINE & JONATHAN P. WEINER, THE NEW MEDICAL
MARKETPLACE 167 (1988).
115 Accord Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Smither, 573 S.W.2d 363 (Ky. Ct. App.
1978). The court wrote:
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wheeled an empty shopping cart up to the grocer each week and
asked him what he thought it would be "dietarily appropriate" to
eat.116 Although ethical and clinical standards deter physicians
from ordering completely unnecessary tests, and coinsurance and
inconvenience decrease patients' willingness to undergo excessive
testing and medical procedures, ample data suggests that physician
financial incentives are nevertheless a significant determinant of
treatment behavior.
117
Similar incentives affect doctors called to testify in coverage
disputes. Even if they do not benefit directly from the particular
patient in question, doctors may have a strong professional interest
in seeing the particular technology more widely disseminated.
118
We do not believe a treating physician should be placed in this unassailable
position. One need only look to the Medicare and Medicaid System for
alleged evidence of fraud which may occur on the part of doctors ....
Since a large part of today's rising medical costs are borne by organizations
which offer medical benefits plans, such as Blue Cross and Blue Shield, we
believe these organizations should be entitled to some measure of
protection and should be allowed to challenge decisions made by doctors.
Id. at 365; see also Free v. Travelers Ins. Co., 551 F. Supp. 554 (D. Md. 1982). The
Free court held:
[T]he plaintiff's unfettered right to select a physician and follow his advice
does not create a corresponding responsibility in the defendant to pay for
every treatment so chosen.... [T]o require insurers to pay for every
remedy, proven or unproven, prescribed by a physician, could invalidate the
actuarial basis of current premium rates.
Id. at 560.
11 In a classic fable depicting medical inflation in terms of the eating habits of the
citizens of the mythical country "Gourmand," the story concludes:
Large numbers of people spent all of their time ordering incredibly elaborate
meals. Kitchens became marvels of new, expensive equipment. All those who
were not consuming restaurant food were in the kitchen preparing it. Since no
one in Gourmand did anything except prepare or eat meals, the country
collapsed.
Judith R. Lave & Lester B. Lave, Medical Care and Its Delivey: An Economic Appraisal,
35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 252, 253 (1970), quoted in Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250, 274-76 (1974).
1 7 See e.g., Bruce J. Hillman et al., Frequency and Costs of Diagnostic Imaging in
Office Practice: Comparison of Self-ReferringandRadologist-ReferringPhysicians, 323 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1604, 1604-1608 (1990) (finding that physicians with a financial
investment in diagnostic imaging equipment ordered four times more imaging
examinations than physicians without a financial investment in such equipment).
118 See Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 846 F.2d 416, 426-27 (7th Cir.)
(PosnerJ., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988). Concerning
the physicians who testified in favor of reimbursement for in vitro fertilization,Judge
Posner observed that "[a]s it happens these physicians are specialists in the treatment
of fertility and naturally want to encourage the use of exciting and promising
treatment." Id. at 427.
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Many physicians have adopted the ethic in insurance matters that
the ends of treatment justify even a borderline-fraudulent means of
obtaining payment.
119
b. Constraints on Insurers' Conflict of Interest
On the other hand, giving the insurer absolute authority over
coverage decisions could create an even stronger conflict of interest
operating in the direction of withholding treatment. The insurer,
after all, stands to profit from not paying claims, particularly after
it has enrolled the subscribers and collected the premiums. This
point is beginning to occupy much of the health benefits litigation
under ERISA. 120 A considerable number of safeguards, however,
are already in place to prevent the insurer from acting in an
opportunistic fashion.
First, over half the claims that insurers process are for self-
insured clients.121 For these clients, the insurer has no immediate
economic conflict because it is paid only for its administrative
services and is not at risk for claims paid. In fact, since the insurer
is commonly paid a percentage of the value of the claims that it
honors, the financial incentive is to pay more claims. Plaintiffs might
argue that there is still an incentive to deny claims because a self-
insured employer is more likely to renew an administrative services
contract if the insurer saves the employer money.122 The employ-
er, however, is more likely to be concerned about employee
dissatisfaction if the claims administrator denies too many
claims. 123 Therefore, there is no more basis for using contract
119 SeeJohn P. Bunker et al., Evaluation of Medical-Technology Strategies: Effects of
Coverage and Reimbursement, 306 NEW ENG.J. MED. 620, 622-23 (1982) (documenting
the "obfuscation," "miscoding," and "deliberate effort to conceal" that commonly
occurs when physicians submit new experimental procedures for reimbursement);
Dennis H. Novack et al., Physicians'Attitudes Toward Using Deception to Resolve Difficult
EthicalProblems, 261JAMA 2980,2980 (1989) (finding that the majority of physicians
surveyed were willing to "misrepresent a screening test as a diagnostic test to secure
an insurance payment").
120 See infra text accompanying notes 239-42.
121 See Steven DiCarlo &Jon Gabel, Conventional Health Insurance: A Decade Later,
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Spring 1989, at 77, 82.
122 See Reilly, 846 F.2d at 424 ("In the long run, if Blue Gross were to grant too
many claims .... it might be replaced as the plan's administrator.").
See Nazay v. Miller, 949 F.2d 1323, 1335 (3d Cir. 1991) ('The employer... had
incentives to avoid the loss of morale and higher wage demands that could result
from denials of benefits."); see also INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CONTROLUNG COSTS,
supra note 56, at 109 ("[I]n a roundtable discussion with benefits managers from
several large companies that the IOM held in Dec. 1988, some firms were portrayed
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law to police the employer's choice of the claims administrator than
there is to second-guess its decision of how much health insurance
to buy in the first place.
The concern over financial self-interest is perhaps more
apparent for self-insured employers who make their own in-house
medical necessity determinations. Far from viewing the incentives
in this light, however, decisions under ERISA have underscored the
propriety of economically conservative claims administration by
employer plan administrators. This perspective is derived from the
realization that claims paid out of a pool of money dilute the funds
available to the other employees. Thus, ERISA law, far from
viewing employers as unfairly influenced by financial incentives, sees
them as fiduciaries charged with managing the assets of the plan for
the use of all beneficiaries. 124 This fiduciary perspective makes
explicit the cost/benefit tradeoffs involved in medical decisions-the
same tradeoffs that courts too often fail to recognize.1 25 As a
consequence, the only conflict the employer faces is that between
a single claimant and a pool of beneficiaries, the very conflict that
should be foremost in the insurer's mind when assessing medical
appropriateness.
126
as slow to adopt prior review out of concern that they would antagonize their white-
collar employees."); Havighurst & Hackbarth, supra note 96, at 1301 ("Because, in
a competitive market a plan would have to satisfy both consumers and providers
about the fairness of the mechanism employed in making these decisions, hardship
should be kept to a minimum.").
124 See William L. Scogland, Fiduciary Duty: What Does it Mean?, 24 ToRT & INS.
L.J. 803, 829 (1989) ("Indeed, liability has been imposed in a situation in which an
administrator has paid persons who were not entitled to benefits under the fund ...
because of the fiduciary's duty to defend the fund."); see also Brown v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 898 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 712 (1991). In
Brown, the court observed:
Decisions on behalf of a plan in the form of a trust lend themselves less
readily to the accusation of conflicting interests and are more easily
justified .... Fiduciaries are obligated to act not only in the best interest of
beneficiaries, but with due regard for the preservation of trust assets,....
bearing in mind the interests of all participants and beneficiaries.
Id. at 1567-68 (citations omitted). The Brown court errs, however, by erecting
impossibly complex burdens of proof that fiduciaries must meet in order for their
group-based decisions to be sustained. See infra text accompanying notes 214-20.
,25 See generally Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental
Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. Ci. L. REv. 1105, 1126-38 (1988)
(discussing the desirability of aligning the plan administrators' interest with the
employer's interest).
126 See infra text accompanying notes 149-54.
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The concern over insurers' financial incentives becomes more
forceful under conventional indemnity arrangements where a third
party insurer bears the insurance risk. Nevertheless, it is still not
the case that insurers enjoy absolute, unreviewable discretion;
several countervailing forces constrain their latitude. First, some at-
risk insurers do not make their own medical necessity decisions.
Those contracting for utilization review services with outside firms
turn this decision over to disinterested reviewing personnel.
127
These utilization review firms either apply their own criteria or
purchase review criteria developed independently. 28 Additional
assurance of neutrality is provided by the fact that, under the usual
practice, claims are denied for medical inappropriateness only if
they are reviewed by a physician consultant who is a licensed
practitioner exercising his own independent medical judgment.1
29
Most of these physicians are compensated on an hourly, salaried, or
piecework basis that does not reward the number of denials.
30
127 The Institute of Medicine's report on utilization review observes that there are
three categories of reviewers: (1) freestanding, (2) insurer-based without provider
contracts (i.e., traditional indemnity insurance), and (3) insurer-based with
participation contracts (i.e., Blue Cross plans and preferred provider organizations
(PPOs)). The report states that "[fln the first category... the party at risk may be
an employer, an insurer, or even an HMO or PPO that contracts with the organiza-
tion for utilization management services." See INsTrrUTE OF MEDICINE, CONTROLLING
COSTS, supra note 56, at 62-63. Frequently, though, these utilization review firms
have been purchased as subsidiaries of insurers and thus are not wholly independent.
128 Value Health Science is one firm that sells utilization review criteria. Many of
the senior members of Value Health Science were originally employees of Rand
Corporation and were funded by the federal government to develop appropriateness
criteria. See Kramon, supra note 84, at 12.
Even when utilization review is done by the insurer in-house, the corporate
organizational structure provides some assurance that the individual people who
actually make medical assessment decisions are sufficiently insulated from undue
economic or managerial conflicts if a departmental separation exists between
underwriting and claims administration.
129 See INsTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CONTROLLING COSTS, supra note 56, at 85
("[Reviewing doctors] make little direct use of formal screening criteria. They are
expected to make decisions based upon their own clinical judgment.").
130 None of the review organizations surveyed by the Institute of Medicine paid
their physician reviewers on a basis that rewarded the number of denials. See id. at
278-79. Likewise, most review organizations themselves are compensated by their
clients on a per-person or per-review basis, not on the size of their savings. See id. at
169.
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c. Market Discipline, Professional Standards, and Judicial Review
Even for those financially self-interested review decisions made
in-house by risk-bearing insurers, insurance purchasers have three
additional safeguards that help allay conflict of interest concerns.
One safeguard exists through the marketplace, the second through
the professionally oriented standard that governs insurers' decisions,
and the third through the courts. 3
The present health insurance market is highly competitive.
13 2
It is dominated by large employer group purchasers who bargain
aggressively over short-term contracts. The health insurance market
contrasts markedly in this regard with life insurance, which is
1s1 The insurance industry has argued that a fourth avenue of protection is
available: the "experience rating" pricing system that prevails for most health
insurance sold in the United States. "Experience rating" means that the annual
recalibration of premiums will reflect each insured group's actual claims experience
for the prior period. Therefore, it is argued, an insurer is at little risk and has little
temptation to refuse payment, because all amounts it pays are recouped in next years'
premium increases. See Brief of Amid Curiae ACLI and HIAA in Support of the
Petition for Certiorari, Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Brown, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 712
(1991) (No. 90-494). This argument, however, does not accurately reflect the true
market dynamic. Although some insurance is written to create an actual stop-loss
provision for the insurer that allows it to recoup from the employer claims paid in
excess of a stated maximum, conventional, open-ended insurance leaves the insurer
exposed to the risk for the entire term of the contract. The ability to soften any
losses by next year's increases is determined by how much competing insurers will bid
for the employer's business. The fact that they too will look to past claims experience
in pricing their bids does not mean that the final price will create a windfall. Instead,
the experience-rated price will be the market's best estimate of the following year's
actual costs. Therefore, the risk borne in prior years goes unmitigated. This
argument boils down to the observation that the risk is limited to a year (or whatever
the stated renewal date is). But during that year, the risk is fully borne by the
insurer, as it will be during the following year, and the year after, as long as the policy
is renewed.
Nevertheless, the insurance industry's argument is well taken to the extent that
many experience-rated contracts are written in a manner that severely dampens the
risk actually borne by the insurer. The preceding discussion assumes prospective
experience rating, where past experience is used to fix the next year's rate in advance.
Many contracts, however, use various forms of retrospective experience rating, which
adjusts the total premium, either up or down, at the end of the term to reflect the
group's actual experience during the term of the contract. See CHARLES W.
WRIGHTSON, HMO RATE SETTNG AND FINANCiAL STRATEGY 216-17 (1990). These
contracts are actually hybrids between self-insured and fully-insured-the insurer and
employer share the risk. To the extent that these arrangements shift the risk to the
employer, the insurer's potential conflict of interest is indeed mitigated.
152 "There are more than 800 commercial insurers, 90 BC/BS [Blue Cross/Blue
Shield] plans, and over 600 HMOs doing business in the United Stated." Henry T.
Greely, AIDS and the American Health Care Financing System, 51 U. Prrr. L. REV. 73,
104 (1989).
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composed more of individual contracts covering a much longer
period.133  Insurers who attempt to make excessive profits will
quickly see their clients switch companies or move to self-insurance.
Moreover, overly profiteering health insurers are subject to the
same labor market discipline that constrains self-insured employers
who hire claims administrators. 34 The number of labor strikes
attributable to health benefits concerns demonstrates the sensitivity
of corporate benefit managers to fair coverage determinations.
13 5
As a result, insurers are acutely aware that a well-publicized dispute
over an inappropriately denied claim might cause them to lose the
next renewal of their contract.
A second avenue of protection arises because of the profession-
ally oriented standard governing insurers' coverage determinations.
This standard refers primarily to prevailing medical practice and is
administered in the final analysis by licensed physicians. 3 6 Other
commentators suggest quasi-conspiratorial explanations of why
health insurers uniformly define their coverage in terms that appear
to delegate the reimbursement decision to the same medical
community that is being paid. 3 7 But a less sinister, more worth-
while purpose than enriching physicians may be at play. A
professional standard is chosen as a means of striking a sensible
compromise between the need for flexibility in a health insurance
product and the need for some passably objective standard that sets
limits to the coverage. Because the universe of possible adverse
health conditions is far too numerous and varied to define a precise
schedule of payments for specified compensable events, the parties
to the insurance contract resort to generic concepts of illness and
medical necessity to define coverage. 3 8 The need to counteract
133 The fluidity and competitiveness of the health insurance market is manifested
by the rapid erosion of the share of business that has been lost to self-insured
employers over the past decade. See DiCarlo & Gabel, supra note 121, at 77 (noting
that from 1977 and 1987, the percentage of privately insured employees working for
self-insured employers rose from 9% to 36%).
" See Havighurst & Hackbarth, supra note 96, at 1300 ("Numerous conflicting
interests must be addressed, and the plans that are most successful in accommodating
these conflicting interests will be most successful in the marketplace. Plans that are
too cumbersome will not and should not survive in a competitive market.").
135 "The A.F.L.-C.I.O. estimates that three-fourths of the days lost to strikes in
1989 involved disputes over health care [benefits]." Uchitelle, supra note 99, at D23.
136 See ASSESSING MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 81, at 53 (stating that the
insurance industry delegates decisions to the profession by consulting medical
literature and medical experts, and does not evaluate efficacy per se but rather
"providers' acceptance of a technology as standard practice").
117 See Havighurst & Hackbarth, supra note 96, at 299.
138 The fact that they have chosen established practice itself as the judge of
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the treating physician's resulting conflict of interest, however,
requires a mechanism to police the physician's treatment-ordering
decision. One such mechanism is to place the decision in the hands
of the insurer. This alignment strategically balances the competing
conflicts of interests of the insurer against the doctor by requiring
the insurer to justify its denials under a physician-oriented stan-
dard.
139
A final avenue of protection is the courts. No matter how much
discretion a contract gives the insurer, courts will never dispense
with a level of review entailing at least a showing of minimum
rationality and substantial evidence, 140 concepts that are well-
articulated in administrative law and constitutional due process
jurisprudence. 141 This requirement is imposed by the obligation
of good faith and fair dealing that attaches to every contract.
142
appropriateness does not necessarily mean that accepted practice is ideal. This has
occurred only because there is no other external, objective source for assessing
medical appropriateness. See Clark C. Havighurst, Practice GuidelinesforMedical Care:
The Policy Rationale, 34 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 777, 796-97 (1990). If an alternative
objective standard for assessment should emerge, such as the findings of the external
technology assessment organization that we advocate, see infra text accompanying
notes 190-92, then the parties to the insurance contract should not be foreclosed
from choosing this new standard to replace the present professional standard.
139 Moreover, the fact that this medical standard has been inflated by the very
financial incentives that the insurance system creates (as well as by defensive medicine
concerns) means that it contains a large margin for error. Therefore, even if an
insurer were to stray below the perceived professional norm, subscribers still have
some confidence that coverage decisions will remain within the broad range of
acceptable practice patterns.
140 See Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 846 F.2d 416, 423 (7th Cir.)
(stating that "ERISA's provisions do not permit such potential abuses; decisions and
their rationales are reviewable" and that therefore the insurer is not the sole
authority), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988); Nalezenec v. Blue Cross, 569 N.Y.S.2d
264,265 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (holding that "solejudgment" language "does not give
[the insurer] an unfettered right arbitrarily to reject claims for skilled nursing care;
... a denial of coverage is subject to judicial review"); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 187 cmt. k (1959) ("It is against public policy to permit the settlor to relieve
the trustee of all accountability.... [T]he trustee should be answerable to the courts,
so far at least as the honesty of his conduct is concerned.").
141 See infra text accompanying notes 220-70. How stringently courts should
review insurers' decisions under this standard is an issue we defer to Section III.
142 See, e.g., Franks v. Louisiana Health Serv. & Indem., 382 So. 2d 1064, 1068 (La.
Ct. App. 1980) (finding that allowing the insurer discretion in defining medical
necessity does not constitute invalid "potestative condition" since the insurer is
"under an obligation to make an honest, sincere effort to determine whether
hospitalizations... were medically necessary" and "was required to make a good faith
effort byuse of medical experts to determine the necessity of hospitalization");Jacob
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 758 P.2d 382, 384 n.1 (Or. Ct. App. 1988) (reasoning
that insurer review is not unconscionable because "Blue Cross does not have
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2. Judicial Deference to the Chosen Decisionmaker
Courts have gone beyond this limited standard of review,
however, to decide the issue of medical appropriateness indepen-
dently under a de novo standard of review. Although some judges
have perceived the complexity of the choice between the opposing
conflicts of interest and therefore have not prohibited insurer
oversight, 143 many judges still do not honor the parties' choice of
decisionmaker. Instead, they take it upon themselves to decide the
question of medical necessity, despite the contract's explicit
delegation of this authority to the insurer.144 Although, judicial
resolution appears to be an attractive solution to an intractable
choice between imperfect decisionmakers, additional reflection
reveals that private parties might view it in their best mutual
interests to keep these decisions out of the courts.
unlimited discretion to decide what is and is not covered" and "must apply the
objective standards set forth in the exclusions and... carry out its obligations under
the contract in good faith").
143 See supra note 115; see also Myerson v. Associated Hosp. Serv., 314 N.Y.S.2d
834, 838 (1968) (Hecht,J., dissenting) ("I am... mindful of the fact that documented
studies ... have established that unnecessary hospital utilization is a major
contributing factor in ever-rising subscriber rates ... ."); Lockshin v. Blue Cross, 434
N.E.2d 754,756 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980) ("[A] function, basic to the insurer, is the right
'[to determine] whether a claim should be allowed or rejected.'... Without such a
right, an orderly establishment, administration and dispensation of insurance benefits
would be virtually impossible." (quoting Stuhlbarg v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 55
N.E.2d 640, 642 (Ohio 1966)));Jacob v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 758 P.2d 382, 384
n.1 (Or. Ct. App. 1988) (rejecting unconscionability of insurer deciding medical
necessity).
For decisions under Medicare and Medicaid, see Rush v. Parham, 625 F.2d 1150,
1154 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[A] state may adopt a definition of medical necessity that
places reasonable limits on a physician's discretion."); Cowan v. Myers, 232 Cal. Rptr.
299, 303, 306 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) ("[P]laintiffs are in error when they assert the
physician is the sole arbiter of what constitutes a medical necessity.... Not only
would such a rule result in inconsistent and unfair applications based on the variation
between physicians, but the State's requirement of reimbursement would be limited
only by the imagination of physicians."), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 846 (1987).
144 See, e.g., Ex parte Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 401 So. 2d 783, 785-86 (Ala. 1981)
(requiring insurer to pay for a two-week hospitalization following a fall because it was
a medical necessity, even though the contract stated necessity was to be determined
in the judgment of the Carrier); Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Smither, 573 S.W.2d
363, 364-65 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (remanding case for a full trial despite Blue Cross's
judgment that a 77 day hospital stay was not medically necessary).
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a. The Courts' Difficulty with Clinical Questions
The prior discussion has detailed the costs imposed by litigation,
both in terms of the process itself and the deterrent effect that it
creates. 145  More important, however, is the validity of the out-
come; the judicial system lacks the expertise to decide many
scientific questions. 146 Because judges and juries are drawn from
the lay population, they must rely on expert testimony presented in
an adversarial setting. This process tends to distort the evidence
presented and, hence, the accuracy of the outcome. In contrast
with scientific processes, litigants in the adversarial system carefully
choose their witnesses with tactical advantages in mind. Witnesses
that are opinionated and dogmatic are favored over those that have
a more balanced view of the competing merits.147 Moreover,
because winning, not truth-finding, is the ultimate objective,
litigants resort to tactics that actively undermine truthfulness from
a scientific perspective, such as exploiting the demeanor of the
opposing scientists and launching ad hominem attacks on their
personal credibility. These structural problems create serious
obstacles to judges and juries divining scientific fact from scientific
fiction.
148
145 See supra notes 70-91 and accompanying text.
146 This topic has received much consideration in other areas. See generally
MILTON R. WESSEL, SCIENCE AND CONSCIENCE 32-37, 42-55 (1980) (evaluating the
judicial resolution ofsocio-scientific controversies); Milton R. Wessel, Adversary Science
and the Adversary Scientist: Threats to Responsible Dispute Resolution, 28JURIMETRicsJ.
379 (1988) (same); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 353, 394-404 (1978) (discussing lack of appropriate training); Nathan Glazer,
ShouldJudges Administer Social Services?, 50 PUB. INTEREST 64, 66-68 (1978) (criticizing
the judiciary's reliance on theoretical rather that practical or clinical knowledge in
their decision making); Daniel P. Moynihan, Social Sciences and the Courts, 54 PUB.
INTEREST 12, 12-15 (1979) (same). In the context of insurance disputes, see Costich,
supra note 12 (detailing difficulties that courts have applying de novo review to
disputes over medical appropriateness).
147 See Anthony Champagne et al., An Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert
Witnesses in American Courts, 31 JURIMETRIcs J. 375, 388 (1991) ("The willingness of
experts to reach firm conclusions was viewed [by jurors responding to a survey] as
more important in determining believability of experts than were impressive
educational credentials ... or a reputation as a leading expert in the field. .. ").
148 EminentjuristJudgeJack Weinstein observed that "an expert can be found to
testify to the truth of almost any factual theory, no matter how frivolous, thus
validating the case sufficiently to avoid summary judgment and force the matter to
trial .... Juries andjudges can be, and sometimes are, misled by the expert-for-hire."
Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 473, 482 (1986);
see also Michael H. Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules of Evidence:
Insuring Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 45 ("Today
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b. Judicial Bias Toward Individual Versus Group Preferences
Even if litigation were costless and decisions rendered by a
clinically trained judge with access to all the relevant data, there is
another reason why the parties to the insurance contract might not
prefer judicial determinations of medical necessity. The courts,
when presented with a single case, are likely to be influenced by the
dire condition of the patient.149 Superficially, this perspective
seems correct, 150 but further reflection reveals that a broader
perspective should be considered. The proper perspective can be
illuminated using four interrelated conceptual principles: (1)
philosopher John Rawls's "veil of ignorance;" (2) insurability versus
medical necessity as the decision norm; (3) the ex ante versus the ex
post perspective; and (4) adjudicative versus legislative facts.
Coverage disputes are most appropriately viewed as an insur-
ance-purchasing decision by a pool of subscribers, not a medical-
treatment decision made by an individual patient. The denial of
coverage does not prevent the doctor from rendering care;151 it
practicing lawyers can locate quickly and easily an expert witness to advocate nearly
anything the lawyers desire."); Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards
of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 333 (1985) ("The
scientific community is large and heterogeneous, and a Ph.D can be found to swear
to almost any 'expert' proposition, no matter how false or foolish.").
149 Cf. HUBER, supra note 76, at 185-86 ("The only human reaction to the
individual tragedy, viewed close up, is unbounded generosity, which any large
corporation or insurer can surely afford to underwrite .... The jury's focus is always
on private harm after the accident, not on public benefit beforehand.").
'50 See Mehlman, supra note 81, at 876-77 (espousing the individual-in-need
perspective for determining Medicare coverage).
1r7 See Goodman v. Sullivan, 891 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that the
Secretary's regulation denyingpayment for MRI scans does not presume to supervise
or control the practice of medicine, but simply refuses subsequent Medicare
reimbursement for certain kinds of services; while this may influence some medical
decisions, such tangential influence is inherent in Medicare itself); Association of Am.
Physicians & Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 125, 134 (N.D. Ill.) (stating that
the medicare utilization review mechanism "does not prohibit a physician from
performing any surgical operations he deems necessary.... It merely provides that
ifa practitioner wishes to be compensated for his services by the federal government,
he is required to comply with certain guidelines and procedures enumerated in the
statute"), affd mem. sub nom. Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Matthews,
423 U.S. 975 (1975). In Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986),
a case concerning a patient's premature discharge caused by the California Medicaid
program's (Medi-Cal) denial of reimbursement, the court wrote:
The decision to discharge is ... the responsibility of the patient's own
treating doctor.... [W]hile Medi-Cal played a part in the scenario before
us in that it was the resource for the funds to pay for the treatment
sought .... Medi-Cal did not override the medical judgement of Wickline's
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merely determines that, in the insurer's judgment, the subscriber
pool has chosen not to pay for the particular treatment. Thus,
where the parties leave the scope of coverage undefined, a particu-
lar case is rationally decided by asking only what range of treatment
options the purchasers would have chosen to insure at the time they
signed up, not what treatment they want to receive now that the
insurance has been paid for and their illness is manifest.
Moral theory has adopted the metaphor of the "veil of igno-
rance," introduced by philosopher John Rawls, to determine the
proper framework for deriving principles of distributive justice.
The core of Rawls's insight is that, when we determine principles of
justice, we must be blind to our particular circumstances in life so
that "no one is able to design principles to favor his particular
condition." 152 In the present context, one who decides health
insurance coverage should be blind to the consideration of whether
he will personally become ill in the future. Determining medical
necessity from the perspective of a sick patient lifts the veil, whereas
making this determination from the perspective of a person
contemplating an insurance purchase meets the ideal conditions
imposed by Rawlsian concepts of justice.
In the ABMT cases, for instance, the relevant question is not
whether a terminally ill cancer patient for whom all other therapies
have failed would want all possible treatments performed; the
relevant question is whether a cross section of healthy subscribers
would pay their share of the cost of these treatments to provide for
the unlikely event that any one of them were to fall ill. 153 It is
treating physicians.
Id. at 819; see also Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior. Legal
Barriers to Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 431, 463 ("When
insurance companies refuse to pay for medical treatment they consider unnecessary,
we do not think of them as dictating to physicians how to practice medicine. These
third-party payors are merely setting limits on what treatment they are willing to
reimburse."). Havighurst and Hackbarth observe:
It is important to recognize that a coverage limitation in an insurance policy
is nothing more than that. An exclusion from coverage does not necessarily
imply anything about treatment or procedures, or the competence or
efficiency of any providers whose services are not covered. All that is
involved is a voluntary contractual limitation on the right of the insured to
draw on the common fund.... Therefore, any service exclusion that plans
might adopt should not become the subject of a debate over what is or is
not good medical practice or over the medical 'need' for the excluded
service in particular circumstances.
Havighurst & Hackbarth, supra note 96, at 1300.
1O2 JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 12 (1971).
153 The recent decision of Congress to repeal catastrophic health insurance may
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not always the preference of purchasers to insure for all health care
that provides any benefit, or even for all health care that proves to
be cost beneficial.1 54 Some very beneficial care may be well worth
paying for out-of-pocket at the time of illness but may not be
efficient to insure for in advance.
Taking this insurance-purchasing perspective is particularly
revealing in the context of the exclusion of "experimental" treat-
ment. Courts facing the application of this term to new therapies
for terminally ill patients have ruled that any possibility of success
makes the procedure medically appropriate because the patient is
sure to die and all other therapies have proven ineffective.1 55 But
medical appropriateness is not the sole reason for excluding
coverage of experimental treatment. There are serious concerns
about the insurability of experimental care simply because it
constitutes new, unanticipated treatment not reflected in the
actuarial data used to price the insurance policy. Although
purchasers of health insurance might choose to pay an extra
premium to cover rapidly evolving medical technologies, they may
also determine that the price is not worth the insurance benefit.
The expense of the newest technologies 15 6 coupled with the
be instructive. This legislation, which eliminated upper limits on Medicare benefits,
would have benefitted most those individuals with very expensive illnesses. After
being confronted with the full cost of this benefit, groups representing the elderly
protested and were able to force the legislation's repeal. See Thomas Rice et al., The
Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act: A Post-Mortem, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1990, at 75, 80.
154 Cf. Rollo v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, No. 50-597, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5376,
at *22 (D.NJ. Mar. 22, 1990) ("[S]ubscriber premiums should not have to pay for
procedures which are purely experimental or investigative or subsidize every scientist
stirring magic potion in some laboratory at the top of a mountain with lightning
flashing about.").
'55 Thus, the many courts that have ordered payment for ABMT treatment for
cancer patients adopt as their mantra the observation that ABMT, proven or not, is
the patient's "only hope," changing the issue to whether there is any possibility of
success rather than whether the treatment is proven effective. See Pirozzi v. Blue
Cross-Blue Shield, 741 F. Supp. 586, 588 (E.D. Va. 1990) (examining testimony of
doctor who determined that ABMT for breast cancer was the patient's "best chance
for any type of meaningful survival," despite the fact that the only evidence to
support his contention was that it temporarily shrinks the size of the tumor); Dozsa
v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 716 F.Supp. 131, 138 (D.N.J. 1989) (finding that claim for
ABMT of multiple myeloma patient with six months to live was not experimental
because "[i]t was simply the only appropriate treatment available to treat plaintiff's
condition"); see also Bradley v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 562 N.Y.S.2d 908
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (finding ABMT for AIDS patient not experimental, even though
never performed by any other doctor).
156 See Bunker et al., supra note 119, at 621-22 (stating that fees are initially set to
reflect the technologies' development costs and that due to the lack of competitive
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uncertainty of their costs, destroys the central efficiency of
insurance pools.1 57 Therefore, consumers may decide they are
better off bearing the risk themselves (even if this means foregoing
new treatments altogether) until new technologies are in sufficiently
widespread use that their actual effect on the pooled health care
risks can be known with greater certainty and incorporated into
actuarial projections more precisely.
158
Courts are institutionally ill-suited to apply this insurability
perspective to coverage disputes. By the very nature of the
adjudicative process, they are presented with an individual sick
patient who is already insured, not a pool of healthy patients
deciding what insurance to purchase. Economists, who label these
the ex post versus the ex ante perspectives, observe that efficient
legal rules and contractual arrangements cannot be generated from
the ex post litigation perspective. 159 For instance, in the extreme
pressures and insurer oversight, they rarely drop after the technology becomes more
commonplace).
157 It might be objected that this cost is slight in group insurance because rates
are set each year based on the prior year's experience; therefore, there is only a small
gap for unanticipated procedures to arise. On the other hand, this same observation
means that subscribers would be giving up very little by not insuring new procedures.
Therefore, at the margin, they may find it cost beneficial to sacrifice this increment
of coverage.
It also can be argued in response that experimental therapies for terminally ill
patients are the very type of risks that are the most insurable, in the sense that
insurance is most appropriate for high cost, low incidence events with catastrophic
consequences. This is true, but the proper balance of insurable and uninsurable
elements of experimental care can only be struck in the marketplace. For instance,
the market is perfectly capable of producing an insurance product that excludes
experimental therapy except in cases of life-threatening illness. Indeed, this appears
to be the construction that a number of insurers give to their experimental exclusion,
when it is said that they apply it on a "case-by-case basis." Interview withJoel Miller,
Health Insurance Association of America, in Washington, D.C. (April 16, 1991).
158 There is obviously a Catch-22 at play here since the refusal to reimburse at the
outset will greatly slow the dispersion of the new technology. The parties to the
contract may nevertheless desire this effect. As detailed above, many analysts in the
health policy community believe that new technological innovations are diffused much
too rapidly due to the absence of the market test that is usually imposed on
innovations. See supra text accompanying note 96. If new technologies must prove
themselves in an adverse reimbursement environment, only those that are cost saving
or that provide a clear cost beneficial improvement in outcomes will be selected.
159 See, e.g., John H. Goddeeris, Medical Insurance, Technological Change, and
Welfare, ECON. INQUIRY 56, 60 (1984) ("[T]he individual acts ex post as though his
expenditure decisions have no effect on the insurance premium."). Peter Huber
argues:
Wise policy can only be based on the broader perspective. Efficient
deterrence looks at risk in general for the population at large; harsh though
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case of a terminally ill patient, potentially an infinite amount of
money is worth even an infinitesimally small chance of recovery
because without the treatment the patient will not be around to
enjoy whatever is saved by foregoing treatment. 160 Because the
ex post perspective imposed by case-specific judicial review distorts
the courts' analysis of whether the benefits of treatment outweigh
their costs,16 1 the parties to the insurance contract have a compel-
ling reason to withdraw their disputes from the judicial arena. As
Peter Huber has observed,
[S]table insurance requires unemotional assessment of risk and
disbursement of payments, with the temperament of an actuary
and a bookkeeper, treating people as statistics. The driving force
in the law today is sympathy and emotion in the individual case.
Legal rules rooted in a spirit of compulsion, and applied emotion-
ally case by case, are profoundly inimical to insurance.
162
it sounds, the circumstances of the single plaintiff now in court are all but
irrelevant.... A workable compensation system always looks beyond the
individual tragedy to the solvency of the system as a whole.
HUBER, supra note 76, at 60. David Eddy, a leading researcher and policy analyst on
medical effectiveness, discusses this point with respect to ABMT treatment for breast
cancer in particular, but uses terminology that contrasts a societal perspective with
an individual patient perspective: "[M]any activities in medicine that make great
sense from the point of view of an individual patient might not make sense when the
perspective is widened to encompass other activities for other people-what we call
society." David M. Eddy, The Individual vs. Society: Is There a Conflict?, 265 JAMA
1446, 1449 (1991). For a rare decision recognizing the critical nature of this
distinction, see Nazay v. Miller, 949 F.2d 1323, 1338 (3d Cir. 1991) (observing that
the district court erroneously "focus[ed] on this case rather than the overall
administration of the Plan").
160 See PAUL MENZEL, MEDICAL COSTS, MORAL CHOICES: A PHILOSOPHY OF
HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS IN AMERICA 48-51 (1983) (distinguishingbetween the high-
risk and low-risk perspectives on valuing the benefits of treatment).
161 This inherent judicial myopia is demonstrated by the results in Medicaid
coverage disputes, where the group perspective should be much more evident due to
extremely limited funding for the poor. Despite the obvious group impact of
ordering coverage for expensive and questionable services, some courts (notably, the
Eighth Circuit) nevertheless consistently reach extreme results in favor of treatment.
See Meusberger v. Palmer, 900 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that pancreas
transplant must be covered by Medicaid even though considered experimental by
Medicare); Weaver v. Reagen, 886 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding it arbitrary and
capricious to deny Medicaid coverage for unapproved use ofAZT, an expensive AIDS
drug); Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that Medicaid must
fund sex-change operations); cf. American Soc'y of Cataract and Refractive Surgery
v. Sullivan, 772 F. Supp. 666 (D.D.C. 1991) (requiring Medicare to pay for
investigational intraocular lens implants that have not yet received FDA approval).
162 See HUBER, supra note 76, at 192; see also Robert E. Scott, The Case for Market
Damages: Revisiting the Lost Profits Puzzle, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 1201 (1990)
(observing "the tendency of legal analysts to tell the story of contract breach ex post,
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Legal scholars underscore the institutional limits of case-specific
adjudication by using the somewhat more analytical terms of
"legislative facts" or "polycentrism." Adjudication is best suited for
disputes in which all affected parties can be brought into a single
arena and the relevant facts relate to those parties as individuals.
Typically, disputes between two parties to a contract are ideal
subjects for adjudication. Health insurance disputes differ,
however, because the dispute turns upon the broad, societal effects
of disseminating a medical technology whose medium-to-long-term
costs are borne by a pool of subscribers. When these sorts of issues
are presented to public regulators, administrative law scholars have
labeled them "legislative" rather than "adjudicative" issues and have
advocated the use of non-adversarial processes for their resolu-
tion.163 The same notion is captured by Lon Fuller's concept of
"polycentrism," as applied to private disputes. In his seminal article
The Forms and Limits of Adjudication,164 Fuller identified as the
principal limitation to adjudication those polycentric disputes whose
resolution is akin to building a bridge:
165
There are rational principles for building bridges of structural
steel. But there is no rational principle which states, for example,
that the angle between girder A and girder B must always be 45
degrees. This depends on the bridge as a whole. One cannot
construct a bridge by conducting successive separate arguments
concerning the proper angle for every pair of intersecting girders.
One must deal with the whole structure.
166
The cost/benefit trade-offs inherent in medical technology
assessment and the principles of insurability that underlie optimal
insurance contract design, partake heavily of these same aspects of
polycentrism.
167
and thus to define [contract terms] by reference to what has happened in a particular
case ... [rather than] at the time of contract, as though we did not know how the
story would end").
163 See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 235-37 (3d ed. 1991).
164 Fuller, supra note 146.
165 He referred not merely to judicial litigation but to the institution of
adjudication in its broadest possible sense, as contrasted with the two other
fundamental forms of social ordering: contracting and voting. See id. at 363; see also
supra note 146 and accompanying text.
166 Fuller, supra note 146, at 403.
167 See Eddy, supra note 159. The inherent unsuitability of medical appropriate-
ness questions for judicial determination is underscored by the wide variation in
practice patterns, documented by medical epidemiologists such as Wennberg. See
supra note 47. These researchers have demonstrated that the courts operate under
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3. The Market Solution
To paraphrase Winston Churchill, insurer review of medical
appropriateness may be the worst conceivable coverage determina-
tion mechanism, except for all the others. Viewed simply, a
potential insurance purchaser is faced with a less-than-utopian
choice: a treating physician with an incentive for ordering too
much treatment, and a reviewing physician with an incentive to pay
for too little. Nevertheless, the purchaser enjoys the protection that
neither physician, despite his bias, may operate outside the range of
acceptable medical practice.16 8 Within that range, the choice of
whose decision should control is dictated by economics. One
purchaser might prefer a more expensive product that defers
absolutely to her doctor, while a second purchaser, recognizing the
broad range of medicine that is untested and of uncertain benefit,
might decide that the best use of his insurance dollar is to insure
against only the least expensive acceptable course of treatment.
This can be accomplished only if the courts are willing to entrust
the decision to insurers and are willing to give the insurer the
benefit of the doubt in the gray area where there is a legitimate
difference of opinion on effectiveness.
Because there is no ideal decisionmaker with a pure, undistorted
perspective of the scope of health insurance coverage, the courts
lack any public policy basis for interfering with the choice selected
by the parties to the insurance contract, either by explicit or implicit
judicial fiat. This point is perhaps best illustrated by Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs). HMOs must, by their very
nature, integrate the coverage decision with risk-bearing financial
constraints. Because an HMO is both a treating institution and an
a false impression when they assume the existence of a uniform, scientifically
determined medical consensus. Because medical decisionmaking is highly variable
and judgmental, there is no objective criterion to inform a nonexpertjudge how to
decide questions of medical appropriateness, or even how to choose among differing
expert witnesses.
168 See FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986):
Any recommendation that benefits be denied ... is based on the profession-
aljudgment of a licensed dentist that the materials available to him... are
sufficient to indicate that the treating dentist's recommendation is not
necessary to the health of the patient. There is little basis for concluding
that, where such a divergence of professional judgment exists, the treatment
recommendation made by the patient's dentist should be assumed to be the
one that in fact represents the best interests of the patient.
Id. at 464 n.4.
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insuring institution, its coverage decisions are necessarily affected
by its financial interests. The law does not question the propriety
of HMO physicians playing this dual role;169 indeed, public policy
actively promotes this economizing option.170 Yet it is precisely
this option that some existing precedents overtly renounce and that
others silently undermine by their strained interpretation of the
medical necessity and experimental treatment language common to
conventional insurance contracts.
Im. SOLVING THE MEDICAL APPROPRIATENESS PROBLEM
We now change the focus from general policy analysis to
particular contractual and legal issues. We will address how the
principles discussed in Sections I and I can be implemented in
actual contract language and how the contractual alternatives are
likely to fare under existing legal doctrine and judicial predilections.
A. Possible Contract Revisions
A variety of contracting mechanisms are available to define the
limits of health insurance coverage. While all are potentially of
some use, this Section will demonstrate that none of them complete-
ly eliminates the need for the parties to leave a portion of the
covered services unspecified. The best option for resolving disputes
in this undefined area is to specify a decisional process as an
alternative to litigation. Thus, as in so many other areas of the law,
the ultimate solution lies more in the procedure than in the
substance of the matter.
169 Although HMO coverage dedsions have prompted some litigation, there has
been much less than for traditional indemnity insurers. In part, this diminished level
of controversy results from the fact that the process by which an HMO denies
coverage frequently fails to disclose to the subscriber the existence of any controversy
or difference of opinion. See CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY
1209 (1988); ASSESSING MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 81, at 129. Therefore,
courts raise no fundamental public policy objection to HMOs' determinations of
medical necessity even though those determinations are infrequently exposed to
judicial or subscriber scrutiny and so, to some extent, carry fewer procedural
safeguards than similar determinations made under indemnity plans.
170 See The HMO Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to 3OOe-17 (1988).
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1. Specify Excluded Procedures
Lee Newcomer has outlined three contractual mechanisms for
coping with the judicial enforcement problems presented by
medically unnecessary and experimental exclusions.1 7 1 The first
is to. list specific exclusions for all services that are deemed to be
unsafe, unnecessary, or uninsurable. As he and others recognize,
however, this laundry list approach offers only a partial solution.
First, there is the hurdle of judicial inconsistency. Although courts
sometimes profess their desire for the parties to use this technique,
in reality they have shown the same antipathy toward specific service
exclusions as they have toward general coverage terms. 172 For
instance, in Ponder v. Blue Cross, the court held that an exclusion of
"temporomandibular joint syndrome" was expressed in language
that was too technical and inconspicuous to be enforceable.
173
Other courts have complained that more general terms are too
"ambiguous" to enforce. 174
In addition, state insurance commissioners sometimes frustrate
this drafting technique by insisting that procedure-specific exclu-
sions be qualified by language that covers the excluded procedure
whenever it is "medically necessary." 175 This regulatory oversight
entirely defeats the purpose of having an explicit exclusion in the
first place. Moreover, even where insurance regulators impose no
such obstacles, the long lead time involved in redrafting contract
forms and submitting revisions for regulatory approval renders it
infeasible to undertake frequent revisions of highly detailed policy
171 See Lee N. Newcomer, Defining Experimental Therapy-A Third-Party Payer's
Dilemma, 323 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1702 (1990).
172 See supra note 35.
173 See id. at 639-42; see also Cline & Rosten, supra note 15, at 130 ("[I]f contract
language is expanded to deal with a number of specific situations, a court is apt to
find the language unenforceable as being a 'sea of print' or not inclusive enough if
sought to be applied generally." (footnote omitted)).
'74 Thus, one court has held that, as a matter of law, the term "mental illness" is
ambiguous and therefore must be construed in favor or the insured as not
encompassing autism. See Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534,541 (9th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 581 (1990). But see Brewer v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 921 F.2d 150, 154 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1990) (disagreeing with Kunin).
175 See Interview with Gordon L. Tobias, Medical Director of SVP Health Services,
in Concordville, Pa. (Feb. 23, 1991); see also In re Appeal of the Medical Doctor
Provider Class Plan Determination Report, Mich. Dept. of Licensing and Regulation,
Ins. Bureau, No. 90-11109-BC (Aug. 5, 1991) (requiring Blue Cross to cede authority
to treating physicians on determination of medical necessity).
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terms to incorporate up-to-the-minute advances in medical practice
and effectiveness information.
176
Another difficulty with the laundry list approach is the practical
problem of including all materially relevant coverage terms in each
summary of the policy. Some courts have "rejected... out of
hand" the argument that language in a group policy's master plan
may be incorporated by reference into the summary plan booklet
given to the individual members. 177 Another practical problem
with the laundry list approach is that, while it may be possible to
identify clearly unwarranted procedures or specific applications of
useful procedures where care is unwarranted in specific circum-
stances, no listing can possibly be detailed enough to cover all the
permutations that could possibly occur.178 Health status and
patient preferences are simply too varied to practice medicine
entirely by cookbook or computer. 179 Even if this were possible,
176 See Interview with Joel Miller, Provider Affairs Dept., Health Insurance
Association of America, in Washington, D.C. (April 16, 1991).
177 Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1570 n.16 (lth Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 712 (1991); see also Van Vactor v. Blue Cross Ass'n, 365
N.E.2d 638, 644 (111. App. Ct. 1977) ("[S]ignificant policy exclusions contained in a
master contract but omitted from the brochure distributed to policyholders should
not be enforced."); Waldrip v. Connecticut Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 566 So. 2d 434,436-37
(La. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that a state statute requiring that "insured halve] in his
possession the entire contract" prohibits any incorporation by reference). But see
Johnson v. District 2 Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 857 F.2d 514,516 (9th Cir. 1988)
(finding no coverage for liver transplant because it was not contained in the
"complete listing" of covered procedures referred to but not itself listed in the Plan).
Thus, it does not appear the courts would consistently uphold Havighurst's approach,
that policyholders subscribe to one of several competing sets of clinically detailed
practice guidelines, see Havighurst, supra notes 138 & 177, at 796-800, unless it is
feasible to distribute insurance contracts of this bulk.
178 See Monaco & Burke, Gatekeeper Part Two, supra note 15, at 402 n.7 ("If only
those treatments specifically excluded in the policy could legally be denied coverage,
a policy might be as long as the Yellow Pages, and insurers would have to send out
frequent riders so as to catch all the new unproven or questionable treatments that
came down the pike.").
179 See Hall, supra note 151, at 475-77. One of the most common symptoms which
exemplifies this problem is chest pain. Many people come to the emergency room
with such pain but because of the many variables involved there is no set way in
which to treat a given case. In most cases the decision is left to the physician who
must combine all factors affecting that case (such as the patient's history, EKG results,
what the physician has been taught about this decision, etc.) to reach his decision.
Even this does not lead to consistency. While the EKG can be used to decide who
can be sent home and who must be admitted immediately, there remains a group of
patients with abnormal results who are not necessarily having a myocardial infarction.
Because symptoms and pain thresholds vary between patients and because one can
suffer a heart attack and maintain a normal EKG reading, there is no clear cut way
to determine the proper course of action. See Lee Goldman et al., A Computer-Derived
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it is impossible to conceive of physicians practicing under multiple,
competing cookbooks governing each of the dozens of different
insurance plans in which their patients may be enrolled. 80
Therefore, the laundry list technique will inevitably be subject to
legal and practical limitations.
2. Specify the Review Criteria
The second contracting technique is to specify the criteria that
will be used to assess medical necessity or experimental status. For
example, Blue Gross has been criticized by the courts because it
does not incorporate into its contracts the more detailed "technolo-
gy assessment criteria" that it uses to make coverage decisions.
181
Courts have naively urged insurers to specify the "particular
threshold of statistical success" that a new treatment must demon-
strate to be considered nonexperimental.18 2 This is not realistic,
however, because most procedures diffuse into medical practice
without a clinical trial. 188 Even where effectiveness is precisely
quantified, there is no magical "threshold of statistical success" that
would be appropriate in all circumstances.
1 8 4
Protocol to Aid in the Diagnosis of Emergency Room Patients with Acute Chest Pain, 307
NEW ENG. J. MED. 588 (1982); Michael W. Pozen et al., A Predictive Instrument to
Improve Coronay-Care- Unit Admission Practices in Acute Ischemic Heart Disease, 310 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1273 (1984).
180 Moreover, because of the considerable cost involved in developing these
treatment protocols, they are necessarily marketed to insurance companies by
proprietary firms that protect them as trade secrets. Therefore, doctors and patients
may not even have access to the rules that govern their reimbursement. See Hershey,
supra note 19, at 58 (noting that UR firms "jealously guard[] the entire set of medical
criteria, ... [which are] viewed as proprietary data and constitute an essential
resource of the business"); see also Kramon, supra note 84 (describing Value Health
Science's UR system, which is criticized by the AMA's office of quality assurance for
"fail[ing] to share with physicians the criteria on which it [is] basing itsjudgments").
181 See Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 741 F. Supp. 586,590-91 (E.D. Va. 1990).
182 Id. at 590; see also Bucci v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 764 F. Supp. 728, 733 (D.
Conn. 1991) (criticizing Blue Cross for not specifying a "defined validated,justifiable
standard" required before experimental status ceases).
183 The Pepper Commission estimated that only 10-20% of medical procedures
have been subjected to clinical trials. See PEPPER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5,
at 41. Although drugs and devices do require a clinical trial for their primary
intended use, these trials are not required for the diffusion of alternative uses. See
supra note 80.
184 For instance, in Reilly v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 846 F.2d 416 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988), the Seventh Circuit noted that the plaintiffs'
argument resisted the use of a set percent success rate as a litmus test because they
contended that the insurer's discretion over setting the standard could result in the
denial of coverage, "for example, for [all] treatments administered to terminally ill
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A more realistic alternative is to specify the quality of evidence
that is necessary to satisfy the coverage standard, such as data
reported in the peer reviewed literature.18 5  In addition, as we
outline in more detail below,186 refining a structure first proposed
by Kalb, 187 insurance contracts could specify at what level an
assessment is to occur-safe and efficacious, cost effective, or cost
beneficial. Even this approach is problematic, however, because
different reviewers will reach contradictory conclusions due to
differences in their data, their methodology, or their frames of
reference. For instance, some medical procedures are cost-effective
relative to one treatment mode but not to another, or are cost-
beneficial according to some criteria of benefit but not according to
other criteria. 188 Inevitably, these qualitative assessment criteria,
no matter how precisely framed, are subject to interpretational
disputes and are susceptible to judicial manipulation in favor of
coverage. 189 Specifying the substantive appropriateness criteria
more precisely is only a starting point; we must continue to search
for additional methods to limit judicial intervention.
3. Specify the Technology Assessments
The third suggested contracting alternative is to incorporate by
reference the medical technology assessment decisions made by
specified organizations. 190 Numerous governmental and private
organizations actively participate in technology assessment.191 In
patients" for whom the success rate approached zero. Id. at 423.
185 Newcomer goes so far as to suggest covering procedures only if they are
proven effective through randomized controlled clinical trials. He recognizes,
however, that this is infeasible for the vast bulk of medicine. See Newcomer, supra
note 171, at 1702-03.
186 See infra text accompanying notes 202-03.
187 See Kalb, supra note 15, at 1121-24 (advocating the option to select in the
contract among levels of wastefulness versus cost effectiveness of new technologies).
188 See Peter Doubilet et al., Use and Misuse of the Term "Cost Effective" in Medicine,
314 NEw ENG.J. MED. 253 (1986) (detailing the confusion that surrounds the use of
these terms).
189 See Cline & Rosten, supra note 15, at 136 ("[Plolicy language alone cannot
induce social change or force courts to recognize that certainty of coverage facilitates
the cogent economic goal of providing a product at a reasonable cost to the
consuming public.").
190 See Kalb, supra note 15, at 1125; Monaco & Burke, Gatekeeper Part Two, supra
note 15, at 409.
191 Federal agencies performing technology assessments include the Agency for
Health Care Policy and Research as well as the Office of Technology Assessment.
Private organizations include physician organizations such as the American Medical
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principle, it would be a simple matter for a contract to state that it
will not cover a procedure that is determined by any of these
organizations to be unsafe, unproven, ineffective, or outmoded.
Alternatively, the contract could state that procedures will be
covered if and only if they are provided in conformity with
appropriateness indicators articulated by one of these organiza-
tions.
192
Although this technique has greater potential than specifying
specific procedures or specific criteria, it also faces obstacles of both
judicial enforcement and practicality. Some judges are reluctant to
allow insurers to delegate their assessment to organizations that are
not parties to the contract, even if they are closely related insurance
trade associations. 193 These courts believe that it is unfair to
deny the subscribers a chance to confront the ultimate decisionmak-
ers with conflicting evidence and argument, 194 or they reason that
Association and the American College of Physicians, hospital based groups such as
the Johns Hopkins Program for Medical Practice and Technology Assessment,
individual private insurance companies and their trade associations, and private
technology assessment firms such as Battelle and Health Technology Associates. See
Resources Supply Technology Information, HosPrrALS, Aug. 5, 1989, at 42.
192 See e.g., Waldrip v. Connecticut Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 566 So. 2d 434, 435 (La.
Ct. App. 1990) (noting that the contract defines "experimental" as any treatment "'not
approved or accepted as essential to the treatment of injury or sickness by any of the
following- (1) the American Medical Association; (2) the United States Surgeon
General; (3) the United States Department of Public Health; or (4) the National
Institutes of Health'"); Bradley v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 562 N.Y.S.2d 908,
909 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (noting that the plan in question excluded experimental
treatment "according to guidelines established jointly... by the State of New York,
Blue Cross and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company").
193 See, e.g., Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 846 F.2d 416,423 (7th Cir.)
(stating that defendant's reliance on Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association's
determination that in vitro fertilization is experimental created "an inherent risk of
abuse"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988); Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 741 F.
Supp. 586,590 (E.D. Va. 1990) (noting that the medical director "merely 'applied the
policy' [memorandum from Blue Cross/Blue Shield] and rejected plaintiff's pre-
authorization for [ABMT], solely on the ground that the Association deemed the
procedure experimental"). This illustrates the impossible bind that courts can impose
on insurers; in other decisions they have criticized insurers for the conflict of interest
that occurs when they fail to delegate the coverage decision.
194 See Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534 (9th Cir.) (noting that
the insurer's medical director consulted with three psychiatrists whose knowledge
about autism was nowhere in the record and that the director failed to consult with
plaintiff's physicians), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 581 (1990); McLaughlin v. Connecticut
Gen. Life Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 434, 439 (N.D. Cal. 1983):
The only investigation [on immuno-augmentative therapy as a lung cancer
treatment] done at all was by [the medical advisor]. He read a few articles
... and made a phone call to another doctor to discuss it. However he did
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incorporating by reference the present and future decisions of
outside organizations fails to give the subscriber fair notice of the
scope of their coverage.
195
On a practical level, deference to external technology assessment
organizations is not a complete solution. First, this mechanism will
not address many existing and new technologies simply because the
available resources are too limited to apply formal assessment
techniques to the vast array of new and promising medical proce-
dures, devices, and drugs in all their possible uses and combina-
tions, let alone the many thousands of existing treatments that are
untested or for which tests are out of date. 196 Second, the num-
ber of organizations performing technology assessments combined
with the variety of criteria likely to be used suggest the possibility
that two organizations performing technology assessments could
reach opposite conclusions. This will lead to a debate over whose
methodology is superior.
B. A Prototype Coverage Determination Process
The overriding defect in these three contracting options is that
they are directed primarily toward the substance of the decision, not
the process for making the decision.1 97 Regardless of where the
not contact Mrs. McLaughlin's United States doctors, the Immunology
Researching Centre where Mrs. McLaughlin received treatement, or any
doctor who supports the therapy.
195 See Waldrip, 566 So. 2d at 436-37 (holding contract terms invalid under
Louisiana statute that requires the entire agreement to be contained in a single
document).
196 Thus, in the Bradley case, the court observed that the designated entities had
issued no assessment decisions on the particular use of ABMT at issue in that case.
See Bradley, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 909; see also Rollo v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, No. 90-597,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5376, at *13 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 1990) (noting that Blue Cross and
Blue Shield Association had considered ABMT for several forms of cancer, but not
for the particular type of cancer in this case); PEPPER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
5, at 41 ("[O]nly 10 percent to 20 percent of medical practices are supported by
randomized controlled trials."); Newcomer, supra note 171, at 1703 (observing that
the inability to perform randomized clinical trials will create "orphan diseases" for
which there are no assessments).
197 Wilson v. Blue Cross, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), which concerned
the liability of utilization review organizations, dramatically illustrates the pitfalls of
failing to specify in the insurance contract the review mechanism to be used in
making medical necessity assessments. The doctor for the Wilson's son ordered a
month-longhospitalization for major depression, drug dependency, and anorexia, but
Blue Cross announced that it would discontinue coverage after two weeks, following
the recommendation ofWestern Medical Review Organization, with whom Blue Cross
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parties settle along the spectrum of specificity, from procedure-
specific exclusions to generic criteria for appropriateness, an
unsatisfactory arbiter of the inevitable disputes could frustrate the
design of the contract. Because the parties could never anticipate
all of the inventive objections that courts are capable of posing to
the wording of substantive coverage terms, and because courts are
ill-equipped to resolve medical appropriateness disputes, the only
resort is to specify in the contract an alternative mechanism for
making unanticipated and unspecified coverage decisions. This
Section proposes a new coverage determination mechanism and the
following Section analyzes how it is likely to fare in the courts.
A prototype coverage process would contain these specifications:
(1) Particular treatments the parties know in advance they do not
wish to cover.
(2) Standards to determine under what circumstances unspecified
treatments are covered.
(3) An entity to apply these standards in making prospective
assessments of medical treatments. These assessments would
be general rulings that apply to all patients.
(4) The same or a different entity to make case-specific applica-
tions to particular patients of the specified exclusions in (1),
the standards in (2), and the general rulings in (3).
(5) Criteria for determining when sufficient additional informa-
tion requires the entity to reconsider its general (3) or specific
(4) rulings.
(6) The processes to be used in (3), (4) and (5), and an agreement
that the determinations these processes produce are within the
sole discretion of the specified entities and are binding on all
parties.
(7) An agreement that the role of the courts is limited to assuring
that the processes actually followed are a reasonable interpre-
tation of what the contract specifies, and an agreement that
the primary remedy for any defect in process is to have the
case properly reconsidered using the correct procedures, not
for the court to decide the issue itself.
had contracted for concurrent utilization review services. See id. at 877, 880-81. Two
weeks after his discharge, the patient committed suicide. See id. at 887. The court
held that Western Medical must stand trial in a suit by his parents seeking
compensation, in part because it "used the concurrent utilization review process
without knowledge as to whether the decedent's Alabama Blue Cross policy allowed
for such review," which along with other evidence, was sufficient "to raise a triable
issue of material fact as to whether Western Medical's conduct was a substantial
factor in causing the decedent's death." Id. at 883.
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This skeletal articulation of our proposal obviously leaves many
issues to be determined by the parties. We can offer an opinion on
some of them in the following sections; but inevitably there will be
room for considerable variation in the specifics that individual
employers and insurers choose to negotiate.
1. General Coverage Decisions
The most critical question is who should conduct the assessment
process noted in (3). Traditionally, an insurance company's medical
director makes the final coverage decision when medical necessity
is in dispute. It is the medical director who frequently discusses the
scope of coverage with the client during contract negotiations and
who sets coverage policy in combination with the client and other
members of the insurance company. For reasons developed in the
previous section, many purchasers will continue to prefer a medical
appropriateness review mechanism that is supervised, if not actually
conducted, by the insurer. Conflict of interest problems, however,
as well as the inefficiency resulting from hundreds of individual
medical directors conducting redundant technology assessments,
suggests the necessity of a fresh approach. Several commentators
have advocated that the insurance industry (either through
individual companies or through their various insurance trade
associations) fund an external technology assessment organiza-
tion198 to perform some of these functions.199 These proposals
198 Delegating these review functions to industry trade associations themselves, as
the Blue Cross plans have tended to do, is not likely to alleviate these conflict
problems in the perception of the courts. Obviously, the precise composition of the
external entity will determine how convincing a case insurers can make for its
independence and authoritativeness. Two options, plus a hybrid and several
variations, are feasible. One is to construct a new private entity, perhaps housed at
a prestigious university, whose board of directors reflects various interest groups such
as academic researchers, providers, labor, business, insurers, and the public. The
second option is to provide funding to an existing public sector entity, such as the
Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, within the Public Health Service. A
hybrid would be to construct a new, quasi-public entity to serve the same purpose,
perhaps modeled on organizations like the Institute of Medicine within the National
Academy of Sciences.
The option ultimately chosen must satisfy two fundamental concerns. One is the
business needs of the insurers that will fund the organization. They will require
assurance that timely assessments will be issued in sufficient quantity on the
procedures they deem most important to assess, that the methodology used is a
reputable one, and, most critical of all, that the terminology in which the assessments
are issued will be sufficiently definitive and precise to fit snugly the coverage
terminology employed in their contracts. The second basic concern relates to
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are being actively considered by the insurance industry.
20 0
For this organization's decisions to solve the contracting
problems just surveyed, there must be a tight fit between the
wording of its decisions and the wording of the contractual
standards specified in subsection (2). This process would be
facilitated if the organization announced in advance a taxonomy
according to which it will assess each technology. The parties to a
particular contract then may choose the particular criteria they wish
to govern their coverage decisions from this precise vocabulary of
standards. For instance, the organization could undertake to
classify each drug, device, or procedure into one of the following
categories 20 1 (arrayed in ascending order of restrictiveness):
A. Unsafe;
B. Safety in doubt;
C. Safe but ineffective, less effective than available alternatives,
or effectiveness in doubt;
D. Safe and effective but not cost effective, that is, less costly
alternatives achieve equal results;
antitrust risks. The potential effect of the entity's decisions on the financial well
being of medical equipment firms, drug manufacturers, and providers means that the
entity must be constructed in a manner that avoids any serious accusation of collusive
denials of reimbursement by the insurance industry. This goal is best accomplished
by removing insurers' control over the operation of the entity and by eliminating any
uniformity in their response to the agency's decisions, but these measures also tend
to undermine the business purpose of the entity. Nevertheless, if it is clear that
insurers do not control the content of the entity's decisions (only its funding and
structure), and if each insurance company acts unilaterally in implementing the
entity's decisions, antitrust concerns could be held to a minimum.
I SeeJohn P. Bunker et al., Evaluation of Medical Technology Strategies: Proposal
for an Institute for Health-Care Evaluation, 306 NEW ENG.J. MED. 687 (1982) (second
of two parts); Arnold S. Relman, Assessment of Medical Practices: A Simple Proposal, 303
NEW ENG. J. MED. 153, 154 (1980); cf. Arnold S. Relman, Reforming the Health Care
System, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 991, 992 (1990) (advocating that more money be
invested in a "wide-ranging technology assessment program").
It is not essential to this proposal that there be either a new entity or a single
entity. We note, however, that the existing assessment organizations are not presently
situated to perform this function. Primarily, this is because the entity's tasks must be
carefully specified in advance for it to solve the insurance contracting problems.
Existing agencies are too varied in the processes by which they conduct their reviews
and the terminology in which they express their conclusions for insurance contracts
to attach cleanly to them. If, however, an existing agency were to modify itself along
the lines outlined in the following text, it could meet the requirements of this
proposal.
00 See Telephone Interview with Dan Dragalin, M.D., former Medical Director of
Prudential Insurance Company of America (Mar. 16, 1991).
201 These categories are similar to those in Paul Kalb's proposal. See Kalb, supra
note 15, at 1121-24.
ASSESSMENT OF MEDICAL NECESSITY
E. Cost effective (superior results not available elsewhere for
lower costs);
F. Cost beneficial, that is, increment in increased effectiveness is
worth the cost.
20 2
These terms could be qualified by whatever appropriateness
indicators or case-specific detail the organization chooses to
impose.
To illustrate more concretely, suppose the assessment organiza-
tion ruled that adult liver transplants are generally medically
accepted (for defined levels of liver disfunction, tissue compatibility,
age of patient, etc.); they are cost effective only if performed at
transplant centers that average at least two dozen procedures a year;
and they are not cost beneficial at any location, for patients over 17.
An insurance contract that specified coverage at level D (safe and
efficacious) would pay for the procedure (if the appropriateness
indicators are met) at any location, but one that covered at level E
(cost effective) could insist that the patient go to one of the
designated transplant centers. An insurer that specified coverage
at level F (cost beneficial) would not cover adult liver transplants at
all.
This consolidated technology assessment mechanism does not
impose a monolithic outcome on all insurance contracts. First, each
insurance company or each sector of the insurance industry (Blue
Cross, HMOs, or commercial insurers), is free to establish its own
external review organization. Second, each contract will specify its
own criteria for review, which may vary among categories of medical
services. 2°" The ultimate substance of the coverage is left to
individual contract negotiation. As a result, this proposal is likely
202 There is a vast amount of technology assessment literature that gives much
more meaning to these various terms. For instance, effectiveness can be defined in
terms of various measures of health outcome (lives saved, years of life, or quality-
adjusted life years), or by more intermediate measures of benefit such as increased
certainty of diagnosis. It is not necessary, however, to incorporate any further
definitional precision into the insurance contract. It is only necessary to make certain
that the terms used by the reviewing entity match the terms in the contract.
203 One level might cover all care, or different levels might be chosen for
preventative versus curative care, hospitalization versus outpatient, or surgery versus
medicine, etc. Moreover, different levels might be chosen according to the cost of
the service, requiring a more demanding demonstration ofappropriateness for more
expensive services. Alternatively, lower levels might be chosen for treatments that
address life-threatening conditions. These decisions will be shaped in part by the
ability of contractual language to distinguish precisely and predictably among these
various categories of treatment.
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to encounter less resistance under the court rulings that preclude
insurers from incorporating by reference material into the contract
that is not physically distributed to policyholders. The assessment
organization's decisions are not incorporated wholesale; rather, this
organization is specified as a process for interpreting the contract,
and its decisions control only to the extent that they invoke the
standard of coverage that is chosen in the contract. This constitutes
no more reliance on extra-contractual material than, for example,
a contract that refers to trade custom and usage or to the rules of
the American Arbitration Association.
In order for this process to work, it will be necessary to
continually update technology assessments. As specified in
subsection (5) of the prototype, organizations would be required to
revise their assessments as new information becomes available. An
assessment that a technology is "experimental" at one time must be
modified if additional research or clinical findings validate (or
repudiate) its effectiveness. 20 4 Similarly, if information becomes
available that conventional therapy is no longer medically appropri-
ate, it would be necessary to reclassify such therapy as outmoded.
To avoid disputes over these matters, the contract should specify a
standard for when various assessments must be revisited. 0 5
2. Case-Specific Decisions
The preceding component of our proposal is concerned
principally with the general, prospective assessments contemplated
in subsection (3) of the prototype. As subsection (4) specifies,
however, a mechanism is also needed for case-specific rulings. Each
204 See Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 741 F. Supp. 586, 590-94 (E.D. Va. 1990)
(relying on testimony that ABMT has been routinely prescribed for breast cancer since
1988 to reject the validity of a Blue Cross technology assessment adopted in 1988).
205 The contract might specify that a determination of unproven (experimental)
status is binding for two years, accepted (safe and effective) status for five years, and
unsafe or ineffective status for ten years. Or the parties might specify that an earlier
decision need not be revisited unless brought into question by a certain quality and
quantity of evidence, for instance, two or more subsequent articles published in the
peer-reviewed scientific literature or at least one subsequent randomized clinical trial.
See also White v. Caterpillar, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1418, 1421-22 (W.D. Mo. 1991)
(criticizing Blue Cross for failing to update a 1985 report on ABMT for breast
cancer). See generally H. David Banta & Stephen B. Thacker, The Casefor Reassessment
of Health Care Technology: Once is Not Enough, 264JAMA 235 (1990) (examining four
clinical practice areas to demonstrate the need for continuously reassessing existing
technologies).
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coverage decision under an insurance contract will require a
decision on at least one of the following issues:
1. Whether the patient is eligible and whether the service is
specifically excluded as in subsection (1);2 °6
2. Whether an existing assessment ruling determined in subsec-
tion (3) applies and whether its terms are met;
3. Whether treatment is covered when there is no existing ruling
that applies;
4. Whether changed circumstances warrant reconsidering a
previous denial for a particular patient.
It is possible for the same entity to make both the rule-oriented
decisions and the case-specific applications, 20 7 but this may not
be the preferred choice. Different skills may be required to make
general and specific assessments and, to the extent that the industry
chooses to consolidate the prospective decisions in one or a few
entities, it becomes impractical to funnel case-specific decisions
through a central body. This is particularly important when those
decisions are based on the terms of different insurance contracts.
This approach would also heighten antitrust concerns. 208 There-
fore, it may be necessary that case-specific decisions continue to be
made as they currently are, either through claims processing and
medical director review internal to the insurer or through utilization
review services contracted to independent organizations.
Another option is to employ alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms such as arbitration or formal grievance proce-
dures, 20 9 or more democratic, electoral processes (such as those
206 For example, under typical contracts, the insurer must determine whether the
condition treated is an illness and whether the services are excluded as cosmetic or
purel elective.
20 The Permanente Medical Group, for instance, has a "Bone Marrow Transplant
Advisory Board" composed of seven physicians from its medical staff that determines
when and under what particular circumstances the procedure is no longer
experimental for a particular disease. It relies principally on data published in peer-
reviewedjournals rather than on anecdotal case reports or unreviewed abstracts. For
rare diseases with no published data, however, the Board relies on the consensus
derived from the combined clinical knowledge of its members. See Interview with D.
Blair Beebe, Chief of Staff of the Permanente Medical Group, in Washington, D.C.
(Feb. 23, 1991).
208 See supra note 198.
209 See infra text accompanying notes 271-75 (describing alternative dispute
resolution models); see also EZEKIELJ. EMANUEL, THE ENDS OF HUMAN LIFE: MEDICAL
ETHICS IN A LIBERAL PoLrrY 204-11 (1991); IRVING LADIMER, DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES
FORMODERN HEALTH AGENCIES 149-69 (1979) (detailing mechanics of designing and
contracting for arbitration within HMOs).
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common in organized labor governance committees which have
representatives from both insurers and subscribers). 210 Demo-
cratic dispute resolution is particularly attractive because it mitigates
the conflict of interest of the insurer or self-insured employer at the
same time that it preserves the group perspective of a pool of
insured subscribers.
Whichever case-specific review mechanism the parties choose,
it should give the patient recourse to protest a denial of coverage,
and it should require one or more stages of physician review before
the denial becomes final.2 11 Again, precisely how this is accom-
plished, and with what safeguards, depends on the specifics of an
individual contract, as shaped by requirements imposed by judicial
review.
212
C. The Judicial Standard of Review
The level of scrutiny the courts will apply to these decisions
depends on what model of judicial review courts adopt. Three
somewhat competing and somewhat overlapping models are
available to draw upon: trust law, administrative and constitutional
law, and binding arbitration.
210 See, e.g., Jones v. Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund, 906 F.2d 480, 481
(9th Cir. 1990) ("Because the Board of Trustees consists of both management and
union employees, there is no conflict of interest to justify less deferential review.");
Facchina v. NECA-IBEW Local 176 Health & Welfare Fund, 702 F. Supp. 641,643-44
(N.D. Il. 1988) (noting that Board of Trustees consisting of other workers and union
members met to deny claim). See generally AMA ET AL., GUIDELINES FOR HEALTH
BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION 10 (undated, issued in 1989) [hereinafter HEALTH BENEFITS
GUIDELINES] (endorsing alternative dispute resolution, including "union representa-
tives, plan benefit managers, and established plan mediators"); LADIMER, supra note
209, at Foreword and Introduction (advocating use of greater subscriber representation
on HMO committees that resolve coverage disputes and other matters).
211 See HEALTH BENEFITS GUIDELINES, supra note 210, at 2, 9 (recommending that
utilization reviewers should respond within two business days, allow the attending
doctor to talk with the reviewing doctor, and give the patient an opportunity to
appeal a denial including the right to a review by another medical consultant chosen
by the insurance company).
212 Additionally, there are mounting efforts spearheaded by medical practitioner
groups to regulate utilization review functions through legislation. See Milt
Freudenheim, Doctors Press States to Curb Reviews of Procedures' Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
13, 1991, at Al, D3. To the extent that contracts comply with these explicit
regulatory requirements, they should be deemed sufficient, as a matter of law, for
purposes of judicial review of public policy and reasonableness considerations.
Alternatively, courts might choose to defer to voluntary accreditation standards being
developed internally by the industry, in consultation with provider and business
groups, as setting a consensus standard of care for utilization review procedures.
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1. The Trust Law Model
Decisions under ERISA invoke a trust law model to review the
decisions of health plan administrators. 213  This private law
model, however, is not applicable to the problems of insurance
coverage because it is premised on a trustee administering benefits
to a single, or small number, of beneficiaries. 2 14 Therefore, trust
law does not offer much guidance on how to resolve conflicts
among the beneficiaries or between one beneficiary and the
group. 215 For instance, trust law, taken literally, would not allow
a risk-bearing insurer to have any role in claims administration
because trust law does not merely scrutinize conflicts of interest, it
bars them altogether as a preventive measure to avoid any possibili-
ty that the trustee's loyalty to a beneficiary will be diverted by other
considerations. 216  The very nature of administering a pool of
benefits for a number of beneficiaries requires just the opposite:
the trustee must at some level pursue the interests of the group
213 See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110-11 (1989)
("ERISA abounds with the language and terminology of trust law .... In determining
the appropriate standard of review... , we are guided by principles of trust law.").
214 Professors Fischel and Langbein provide a trenchant critique of ERISA case
law premised on these and similar observations. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note
125, at 1157 ("These [welfare benefit] plans are complex multiparty arrangements,
and it was unwise for ERISA to attempt to capture the complex responsibilities of
plan fiduciaries by analogy to the simpler world of the private gratuitous trust.").
215 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs, § 170 (1959) ("The trustee is under a
duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary."
(emphasis added)). The leading treatises on trust law are virtually silent on multiple
beneficiary problems. Fischel and Langbein suggest the trust law concept of the
"duty of impartiality" as a solution but they give little guidance on how this concept
applies to resolving conflicts between one beneficiary and the group, as opposed to
conflicts among blocks of beneficiaries. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 125, at
1159.
216 In Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 898 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 712 (1991), the court stated:
"The beneficiary need only show that the fiduciary allowed himself to be
placed in a position where his personal interest might conflict with the
interest of the beneficiary. It is unnecessary to show that the fiduciary
succumbed to, this temptation.... Indeed, the law presumes that the
fiduciary acted disloyally, and inquiry into such matters is foreclosed ....
[The] sole purpose and effect [of this rule] is prophylactic."
Id. at 1565 (quoting Fulton National Bank v. Tate, 363 F.2d 562, 571-72 (5th Cir.
1966)); see also Fischel & Langbein, supra note 125, at 1114-15 ("The duty of loyalty
is prophylactic.... The idea is to prevent misbehavior by erecting an irrebuttable
presumption of wrongdoing whenever the trustee engages in conflict tainted
transactions.").
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(which a risk-bearing insurer or employer represents) over the
individual claimant.
217
Fortunately, the trust law model is capable of rehabilitation by
reference to public law doctrines developed in administrative and
constitutional law. These doctrines are much more attuned to these
conflicts because they deal explicitly with the underlying distribu-
tional issues. The Supreme Court has shown itself amenable to this
approach by refraining from taking trust law to its literal extreme;
it has ruled that an insurer's conflict of interest is not disabling but
merely becomes one factor to consider in applying an "arbitrary and
capricious" or "abuse of discretion" standard of review.218 By no
small coincidence, these are terms of art well established in
administrative law. Thus, rather than reformulating trust law to fit
the needs of an insurance dispute, the courts would be better
advised to consider explicitly an administrative law model. A shift
to established administrative law would provide more guidance than
searching in vain through trust law precedents or inventing new
doctrine whole cloth, as some courts have attempted unsatisfactorily
to do.
2 19
2. The Administrative Law Model
An administrative law model for reviewing private insurers'
medical appropriateness decisions provides two helpful guideposts:
(1) an arbitrary and capricious standard of review to determine
matters of substance, and (2) principles of constitutional due
process to determine matters of procedure.
217 Courts implicitly recognize this fact by stressing the trustee's fiduciary
responsibility to the fund, see supra text accompanying note 124, but they fail to see
that this is a bastardization of the fiduciary notion, which usually extends to an
individual and allows no play for competing considerations.
218 See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
219 See Brown, 898 F.2d at 1566 ("[W]e hold that when a plan beneficiary
demonstrates a substantial conflict of interest on the part of the fiduciary responsible
for benefits determinations, the burden shifts to the fiduciary to prove that its
interpretation of plan provisions committed to its discretion was not tainted by self-
interest."). All of this must be decided before undertaking a review of the merits.
A non-circular analysis is impossible, however, since the court indicates that part of
the assessment of taint includes the quality of evidence and reasoning that the plan
administrator used in reaching his decision. See id. at 1564, 1569. Therefore, the
court's complex, ten-page discussion of burden-shifting presumptions boils down to
the result-oriented rule that the court will use intensive scrutiny if it disagrees with
the decision, but will defer if it agrees.
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a. Arbitrary and Capricious Standard of Review of the Substance of
Medical Appropriateness Decisions
The administrative model would view private insurer medical
appropriateness decisions through the lens of a governmental
agency vested with quasi-legislative and quasi-adjudicative authority.
The entity that makes the general assessments is treated, in essence,
as a private legislature "elected" by the parties to the contract. The
entity that makes the case-specific applications of these coverage
policies is seen as a private tribunal. Under this model, the role of
the courts is limited to the appellate level of review that ensures
only that the decision is not arbitrary and capricious and that it is
supported by substantial evidence. These review standards require
the court to give insurers the same level of respect that is given to
trial courts and government agencies: the insurer's decision must
be affirmed even if the court disagrees with it, so long as it is not
irrational.
This standard would apply regardless of whether the insurer
itself makes the assessment or delegates it to an external entity.
Although the external entity may be less biased, courts should
recognize that parties may actually desire the financial incentives
that the insurer brings to bear on the question of appropriate-
ness.22 Therefore, as long as the insurer has made the decision
following the procedures and standards specified by the purchaser,
the courts should presume that any perceived conflict was intention-
al and therefore does not justify heightening the level of re-
view.
221
The arbitrary and capricious standard is well suited to the
subject matter of determining whether a medical appropriateness
decision falls within the wide range of established practice pat-
terns.222 Because the arbitrary and capricious standard acknowl-
edges the possibility of more than one correct answer, it allows
courts to review complex decisions without demanding an unattain-
220 See supra text accompanying notes 139 & 168.
221 This presumption should not hold, however, in unusual cases where the
insurer's decisions are not subject to market discipline, such as where the insurer is
liquidating in the process of bankruptcy or has otherwise discontinued selling health
insurance altogether. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 125, at 1132.
222 See supra note 46.
16991992]
1700 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 140:1637
able degree of certitude.223 Therefore, it more accurately reflects
the reality of clinical practice.
Another advantage of the arbitrary and capricious standard is
that it alleviates the uncertainty effects of litigation that impose
substantial costs on the parties to the insurance contract. Applied
correctly, this standard of review requires the courts to limit
themselves to the record of evidence that was before the insurer at
the time it decided rather than to hear testimony independent-
ly. 224 This elimination of the need to re-prove each decision in
court should enable many challenges to be decided on summary
judgment since compliance with this appellate review standard is a
question of law that can be determined favorably to either party
based purely on a documentary record.
2 25
223 For example, the Institute of Medicine describes one UR firm whose two
physician reviewers held different opinions on which of two procedures is appropriate
for a particular condition. Rather than forcing one of the doctors to compromise his
clinical judgment, the firm assigned patients to these physicians at random. See
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CONTROLLING CosTs, supra note 56, at 85. A more
demanding level of review might view this reasonable solution as irrational, but an
arbitrary and capricious standard is capable of accommodating decision norms that
produce divergent opinions, so long as each choice is itself reasonable.
224 Many decisions have misapplied the arbitrary and capricious standard in this
regard, but more informed analyses under ERISA are beginning to recognize this
error. Compare Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534 (9th Cir.)
(conducting a full-length evidentiary trial even though appellate-type arbitrary and
capricious standard applied), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 581 (1990) withJones v. Laborers
Health & Welfare Trust Fund, 906 F.2d 480, 482 (9th Cir. 1990) ("In making this
determination, we review only the evidence presented to the trustees.") and McMahan
v. New Eng. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 888 F.2d 426,431 n.1 (6th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he district
court should consider only the evidence that was available to New England at the time
of its final decision in this case.").
225 This does not mean that arbitrary and capricious is a rubber stamp for
insurers. They will continue to lose if there is insubstantial basis in the record for the
substance of their decision and if the record is inadequate due to procedural
deficiencies. Also, in the hurly-burly of everyday claims denial or preadmission
certification, it is likely that many cases will exist where the "record" is sufficiently
vague that a trial will be necessary to determine precisely what constituted the basis
for the decision. Courts should, however, guard against expanding this last exception
to summaryjudgment so that it swallows the rule. Uncertainties in what constituted
the record below can always be hypothesized to create an apparent need for trial. See
Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 846 F.2d 416 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 856 (1988). The Reilly court found summary judgment inappropriate, even
under an arbitrary and capricious standard limited to review of the record, and
emphasized that a court must know:
(1) Who made the ultimate decision by Blue Cross that IVF is experi-
mental?
(2) What are their qualifications and on what basis was that decision made?
(3) How many IVF procedures were analyzed to make this conclusion?
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The following decisions illustrate the operation of the arbitrary
and capricious standard properly applied. Injones v. Laborers Health
& Welfare Trust Fund,226 the court deferred to the decision by a
board composed of both management and union employees that
hyperthermia treatment for breast cancer is not effective, despite
conflicting evidence from the woman's physician.227 In Johnson
v. District 2 Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n, 228 the court found no
error in denying coverage for a liver transplant, observing that "we
must resolve the ambiguity [of the term "experimental"] in favor of
the trustees' interpretation if it is reasonable." 229 In contrast, the
court in Schroeder v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United,230 ruled that
the insurer could not discontinue paying for daily home care
services for an extremely debilitated elderly couple for whom the
services were necessary to keep them out of a nursing home.
231
Although coverage was debatable, Blue Cross had paid for the
services in the past and, when the contract was renewed, the couple
had specifically rejected an amended contract and had agreed to a
fifty percent increase in their premium to remain at home. The
court properly found that the prior course of dealing and the
circumstances surrounding the amendment foreclosed Blue Cross
(4) What other evidence was reviewed by the decisionmakers which
suggested that it was not experimental?
(5) How are the decisionmakers compensated by Blue Cross?
(6) How did this decision affect other Blue Cross health plans?
Id. at 424. In most cases, the discovery process should provide sufficient opportunity
to reveal these issues and remove the basis for speculation. AsJudge Posner observed
in Reilly, if the plaintiff has been unable to uncover any actual defects in the processes
and qualifications of the insurers' decisionmaker, then there is no basis for a trial or
a remand. See id. at 427 (Posner, J., concurring and dissenting).
226 906 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1990).
227 The court observed that "fi]n making this determination we review only the
evidence presented to the trustees.... We will not upset the review process the
parties have bargained for...." See id. at 482.
228 857 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1988).
229 Id. at 516. The court also observed that the Plan trustees had "a duty to keep
the Fund financially stable ... [and] 'to provide benefits to as many intended
beneficiaries as is economically possible.'" Id. at 517 (quoting Elser v. I.A.M. Nat'l
Pension Fund, 684 F.2d 648, 656 (9th Cir. 1982)).
230 450 N.W.2d 470 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
231 See id. at 475-76. The husband was afflicted with Parkinson's disease, ischemic
heart disease, anemia, and carpal tunnel syndrome. The wife had cerebrovascular
disease, chronic dementia, hypothyroidism, chronic depression, and hypertension.
See id. at 471.
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from exercising its own independent discretion in determining
medical necessity.
23 2
For this vision of judicial review to work, the parties may need
to undertake several contractual adjustments to respond to various
idiosyncracies of applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to
medical decisions. One adjustment relates to the scope of the issues
that are typically subjected to arbitrary and capricious review.
Under administrative law, this deferential review applies only to
factual and policy questions, not to questions of law.233 Thus, in
the governmental framework, the courts are to construe de novo the
meaning of the statutory terminology that governs the agency.
23 4
The private analogue is that the meaning of the contract is a
question of law for the court to determine de novo.23 5 The
Supreme Court has clarified, however, that where the statute
commits its own construction to the discretion of the agency, courts
are to give heavy deference to the agency in determining questions
of law.
23 6
On its surface, this statutory model has a perfect analogue in the
construction of insurance contracts that explicitly give the insurer
the discretion to interpret "medical necessity" and "experimental."
Indeed, it is precisely such language that the Supreme Court has
recently held to be critical to invoking the arbitrary and capricious
standard of review under ERISA, which governs all insurance
disputes arising out of the workplace. 237 This simple schematic-
de novo review except where the contract specifies deference to the
insurer-is clouded, however, by two complicating factors. First,
whether the contract in fact gives the insurer this degree of
discretion is a matter of interpretation that the courts take upon
232 See id. at 476.
233 See, e.g., Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 898 F.2d 1556, 1559 (11th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 712 (1991); Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910
F.2d 534, 536-37 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 581 (1990).
2 4 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
235 See Baxter v. Lynn, 886 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1989); Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Blakey, 342 S.E.2d 308, 309 (Ga. 1986) (per curiam).
2 6 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,844
(1984).
237 See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110-11 (1989). As to
precisely how the contract needs to be phrased, see Cathey v. Dow Chem. Co.
Medical Care Program, 907 F.2d 554, 559-60 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
964 (1991) (distinguishing between language that merely authorizes or appoints
insurer to act as claims administrator and language that makes the insurer's decision
binding).
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themselves, with conflicting results.238  Second, the Supreme
Court has introduced in the ERISA cases the complication that the
degree of deference is to be modulated where the insurer has a
conflict of interest. 2 9  Precisely what this means is a matter of
considerable confusion in the lower courts, but one decision has
gone so far as to suggest that the basic conflict inherent in an
insurer's retention of risk requires the invocation of de novo review
in all cases.240  It is for this reason that we recommended the
assessment entity be independent of the insurance company (or, for
self-insured companies, of the employer).
A related complication of the arbitrary and capricious model is
the recognition in administrative law that courts apply this standard
with varying levels of scrutiny, according to their degree of
suspicion of agency motives and expertise.2 41  Scholars have
labeled as "hard look review" the standard that courts employ when
they intensify their review of agency decisions beyond their usual
deference. 242  This exercise of the judicial prerogative inherent
2
3a.See Cathey, 907 F.2d at 559-60; Martin v. Masco Indus. Employees' Benefit Plan,
747 F. Supp. 1150, 1153 (W.D. Pa. 1990).
2s9 See Firestone Tire &Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 115.
240 See Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 898 F.2d 1556, 1562-63 (11th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 712 (1991). This interpretation of the holdingis actually
far from clear. What the court said is much more complex. It held that, where a
conflict exists, the insurer is presumed to have been affected by it, unless it
demonstrates to the contrary. See id. at 1565-66. Only if it is successful in rebutting
this presumption will the arbitrary and capricious standard be maintained. See id. at
1566-67. This complex burden-shifting formulation, however, so confounds the
determination of the standard of review with the determination of the merits that it
essentially requires the court to review the merits de novo before deciding whether
to review them under the arbitrary and capricious standard. See Anderson v. Blue
Cross/Blue Shield, 907 F.2d 1072, 1076 (11th Cir. 1990) (describing the Brown
standard as similar to de novo review). Not only do these mental gymnastics
overestimate the abilities of rational thought, even a court capable of following all
these twists and turns necessarily must conduct a factual investigation, which alone
defeats a central purpose of having the more deferential standard.
24 1 See WALTER GELLHORN ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS
475-85 (8th ed. 1987).
242 Id. at 475. For recent examples of inappropriate exercises of "hard look
review," see New York ex rel. Bodnar v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 903
F.2d 122,126 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Given the Secretary's second-hand knowledge, we must
necessarily demand that his review of the record be probing, precise, and accurate.
Our review of the entire record reveals that the Secretary plainly missed items of
pertinent weight in the hospital records."); Reillyv. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United,
846 F.2d 416, 427 (7th Cir.) (Posner,J., concurring and dissenting) (noting that the
majority "conjure[d] up a host of unanswered questions concerning the qualifications
of the members of the advisory committees" in discussing whether in vitro
fertilization is "experimental"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988).
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in the subjectivity of the terms arbitrary and capricious is not dis-
abling, however, if it is used sparingly and is invoked explicitly
rather than tacitly.245 However, the prior cycles of consistently
extreme rulings followed by ineffective contract revisions counsel
much greater judicial restraint in selecting those cases that deserve
more scrutiny.
244
b. Due Process and Minimally Acceptable Procedures for Medical
Appropriateness Determinations
The arbitrary and capricious standard is limited, however, by its
application principally to matters of substance, not procedure.
Procedural questions are generally considered by administrative law
to be subject to de novo review under varying process standards.
This allows the courts considerable leeway to frustrate-through
intensive scrutiny of procedural fairness-those decisions they
disagree with based on substance, but which the arbitrary and
capricious standard prevents them from reversing outright. It has
been noted that the most common exercise of "hard look" review is
for matters of procedure rather than substance, 245 a phenomenon
well-known in insurance coverage disputes. There are two popular
techniques. One, which is illustrated in the ABMT cases, is to
define the scope of the issue so narrowly that current technology
assessments cannot possibly answer the question. 246 The absence
243 Indeed, it may be considered a virtue of the arbitrary and capricious standard
that it contains a mechanism well suited to solving the problems of conflict ofinterest
that have plagued ERISA courts applying the less satisfactory trust-oriented model.
See Van Boxel v.Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052-53 (7th
Cir. 1987); supra note 240. Also, employedjudiciously, this flexibility in the standard
allows a necessary safety valve for the few heart-rending cases like Rollo that otherwise
might undermine public confidence in the judicial system.
244 See supra text accompanying notes 20-69. Moreover, a stringent application of
the arbitrary and capricious standard should not be used as a springboard to the
routine award of punitive damages as well. The failure of courts explicitly to
recognize that they are exercising hard look review leads them to the fallacy that any
erroneous denial of coverage automatically justifies the imposition of punitive
damages because the denial has now been labeled "capricious." See supra text
accompanying notes 86-87.
245 See GELLHORN ET AL., supra note 241, at 475-78.
246 In Rollo v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, No. 90-597, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5376
(D.N.J. Mar. 22, 1990), for instance, the court defined the issue as whether ABMT is
proven ineffective, not for cancer generally or for solid tumor cancers or even for
cancer of the kidney, but for relapsed kidney cancer in a minor. See id. at *12. Thus,
the court was able to conclude that the insurer's review process was "wholly
inadequate to the task." Id. at *11-*12. Other courts have used semantics to vitiate
the intent of the contract. In Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 131
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of a technology assessment for patients with the plaintiff's precise
condition, in the same age group, with the same sex, and the same
medical history leaves the court free to conduct its own assessment
or to allow the patient to win by default. The second technique is
to find that the insurer's investigation was incomplete. In two
notorious cases, courts have awarded large punitive damages against
insurers who denied small claims based on incomplete medical
histories. 247 In one decision, the court ruled that "it was Aetna's
responsibility to marshal all of the medical facts.., before its refusal
to pay,"24 8 an impossibility in the very limited time available for
prospective utilization review. In the second case, the court reached
the same decision despite the insurer's repeated requests to the
physician to forward all pertinent information.
249
This weakness in the arbitrary and capricious standard can
potentially be corrected either by the parties specifying in great
detail the process to be followed in determining medical appropri-
ateness and the remedies for breach of this process, or in the
absence of such specificity, by the courts adopting an explicitly
process-based model for judicial review. A constitutional due
process model is the most suitable candidate for resolving process-
based disputes surrounding medical appropriateness assessments.
This model serves two purposes: it provides a framework for
determining fair procedure when the parties fail to specify one in
their contract, and it sets a minimum floor of procedural fairness
against which the contract is to be tested for public policy and
fundamental fairness concerns when it does specify a procedural
mechanism.
Most conventional indemnity health insurance contracts contain
no specification of how insurers are to go about assessing medical
appropriateness. 250 They do not reveal who is to decide, what
(D.NJ. 1989), although the court found the insurer's review process exemplary, the
court was able to end-run the insurer by observing that it had addressed the issue in
terms of whether ABMT is "investigational," whereas the contract used the term
"experimental." See id. at 137-38.
247 See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 505 So. 2d 1050, 1051 & n.1 (Ala. 1987) (per
curiam) (jury awarded $3,500,000 on claim of $1,650; reduced to $500,000 on
appeal); Hughes v. Blue Cross, 263 Cal. Rptr. 850, 853, 855-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)
($700,000 punitive damages on a $17,000 claim).248 Lavoie, 505 So. 2d at 1052-53. But see infra note 264.
249 See Hughes, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 857-58. The court objected that the requests did
not specify what information the reviewer already had and what he sought. See id.
On the other hand, the providers did not bother to call and inquire further. See id.
at 855-57.
250 See Wilson v. Blue Cross, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 881-82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). This
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records are to be consulted, and what rights the patient has to
object and respond to the initial decision. Even if parties were to
address these questions more explicitly, as is suggested above, it
remains impractical to craft a procedural code that will anticipate
every nuance and procedural nicety that courts could require.
Inevitably, then, the contract will leave a procedural void, 251 and
the courts will quickly fill the empty space with additional require-
ments that insurers must fulfill.
Without a set of concrete principles that bind the courts'
discretion in imposing these procedural hurdles, this game can be
played endlessly. An established reference point is readily found in
the existing body of constitutional due process jurisprudence,
252
particularly those cases relating to disability income and health care
benefits under the Social Security Act. A full exegesis of these
principles is beyond the scope of this Article. A summary reveals,
however, a number of precedents well suited to the present subject
matter. Disability income benefits may be denied without providing
a formal hearing prior to termination.253  In the proceedings
following termination or denial of disability income, Medicaid, or
Medicare benefits, the federal courts have held that it is constitu-
tionally sufficient to employ an inquisitorial rather than adversarial
process, 254 to consult a physician retained by the agency who has
specification does tend to exist, however, in health insurance plans negotiated by
labor unions and in HMO contracts. Requirements for federal qualification of HMOs
mandate a grievance procedure for resolving all subscriber disputes. See 42 C.F.R.
§ 417.10 7(g) (1991). The same requirement is often imposed through state health
department regulation of HMOs. For instance, one Michigan HMO is required to
maintain a four-step grievance process culminating in review by the HMO member
board. See Interview with Maureen Mangotich, Associate Medical Director of Health
Alliance Plan, in Detroit, Mich. (Feb. 23, 1991). Seegenerally LADIMER, supra note 209,
at 86-89, 101-122 (detailing legal requirements and contractual provisions for HMO
grievance procedures).
251 This contractual void does not necessarily mean that the parties actually lack
an understanding on the procedures to be followed, for these details may be spelled
out in informal, extra-contractual documents. For instance, an insurer may retain an
independent utilization review firm to issue preadmission certification under
procedures specified in the insurer's contract with the UR firm, or the insurer may
conduct this review itself according to internal, written operating procedures. These
procedures may also simply be understood from prior practice. Nevertheless, since
these understandings are not adequately preserved forjudicial cognizance, they will
likely do little to settle procedural disputes efficiently.
252 See Varol v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 708 F. Supp. 826, 834 (E.D. Mich. 1989)
(sustaining Blue Cross prior authorization procedures under substantive due process
principles).
253 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976).
254 See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971).
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not personally examined the patient,2 55 to limit the patient's
personal presentation of evidence to a documentary record coupled
with a toll-free phone line,2 56 to have different levels of review for
different amounts in controversy,257 and to preclude judicial
review altogether.
258
Moreover, where the decision in question is a general rule
applicable to an entire class of patients rather than specific to an
individual case, due process does not require any hearing rights at
all for the affected individuals because their interests are reflected
through their representation in electoral, quasi-legislative process-
es. 259 Finally, courts impose few constraints on the highly discre-
tionary decision of whether to employ a quasi-legislative or a quasi-
adjudicative process, that is, whether to decide through general
rules or through case-specific analysis. 260 By no means do these
rulings constitute an ideal procedural code, but at least they set a
baseline of reasonableness or public policy acceptability against
which insurance contracts can be judged. If these procedures
suffice for governmental deprivation of constitutionally protected
property and liberty, surely they suffice as the minimum require-
ments for private contracts.
In applying these principles of "flexible due process," it will be
necessary for courts to recognize that they are not free to impose a
"gold standard" of ideal investigation and decision, as they have
done in the past.2 61 Invoking the constitutional due process
standard connotes a minimum standard of fairness. Courts cannot
continue to object that the reviewing physician did not have the
precise qualifications of the patient's physician 262 or that the
255 See id. at 408.
256 See Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 716 F.2d 23, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (approving
the use of the telephone line in disputes with less than $100 at issue).
257 See id. at 26-27.
258 See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 198-200 (1982).
259 See, e.g., Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441,445-46
(1915) (dealing with a dispute concerning property tax assessments).
260 See e.g., Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 617 (1984) ("The Secretary's decision
as to whether a particular medical service is 'reasonable and necessary' and the means
by which she implements her decision, whether by promulgating a generally
applicable rule or by allowing individual adjudication, are clearly discretionary
decisions.").
261 See HenryJ. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1278
(1975).
. 262 See, e.g., Rollo v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, No. 90-597, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5376, at *9 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 1990) (denigrating insurer's medical expert as one "who
received his M.D. degree 53 years ago,. . . who has not practiced in almost ten years,
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insurer did not investigate every nuance. 263 Giving the patient
and his physician an opportunity to make their case, and requiring
that there be some evidence to support the insurer's final decision,
ensures that whatever procedure the parties in fact choose to follow
will comport with minimal fairness.264  Beyond this, the courts
should not "upset the review process [for which] the parties have
bargained."
265
A critical component of the due process model is the explicit
recognition that the proper remedy for a procedural defect is
reconsideration by the insurer, not automatic coverage plus punitive
damages. To date, courts systematically have denied to insurers the
same opportunity that government agencies, and, indeed, the courts
themselves enjoy to correct their procedural errors. Not only have
judges seized on purely procedural flaws to impose decisions on the
merits, they have used these flaws to extraordinarily amplify
damages under bad faith law. An explicit contractual provision that
specifies the remedy for procedural breaches, as well as a due
process model for judicial review, should help to restrain the worst
excesses of this judicial activism.
26 6
The most difficult of the due process requirements for insurers
to fully satisfy will be the requirement of an unbiased decision-
maker, for, as discussed above, the risk-bearing insurer harbors an
inherent economic conflict of interest.267 A return to the admin-
and who has no experience in bone marrow transplants or Wilms' tumor").
263 See Stan N. Finkelstein et al., The Process of Evaluating Medical Technologies for
Third-Party Coverage, 1 HEALTH CARE TECH. 89 (1984) (comparing technology
assessment by the federal government and private insurers, and concluding that the
latter was much less formal and thorough).
264 See Mordecai v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 474 So. 2d 95, 98 (Ala. 1985) ("We
reject [the] claim that [the insurer] was under a duty to do more than review the
documents claimant submitted to it.").
265 Jones v. Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund, 906 F.2d 480, 482 (9th Cir.
1990).
266 The chance to correct procedural errors should work both ways in the
contract. If a patient fails to apply for preadmission certification, he should still have
the opportunity to justify the appropriateness of treatment after the fact. The
patient, however, suffers the disadvantage of losing the insurer's advance ruling on
coverage and thereby exposes himself to the risk of bearing the responsibility for
payment in the event of retroactive denial by the insurer. Also, to encourage the
orderly administration of claims, the insurer should be allowed to impose a
reasonable penalty (most commonly accomplished via an increased copayment) for
failure to obtain precertification,just as the contract might shift some of the patient's
procedural costs to the insurer where a court finds that the insurer employed an
inadequate process.
267 See supra text accompanying notes 43 & 120.
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istrative law analogy will inform the courts how this conflict should
be analyzed. Judicial analysis of potential bias in agency decision-
makers has determined that conflicting incentives at the institution-
al level are not disabling, for most agencies pursue conflicting tasks
within their broad ambit of responsibility.2 68 For instance in
adjudicatory proceedings, the agency as an institution acts as both
prosecutor and judge, a blatant compromise of adversarial justice.
Nevertheless, courts have accepted these conflicting roles as long as
the individual decisionmakers are not themselves afflicted with
obvious, actual bias.269 Likewise, in the insurance context, if the
actual reviewing physicians who determine medical necessity decide
according to their independent medical judgment and are not
explicitly compensated for refusing coverage, theirjudgment should
be viewed as sufficiently insulated to pass at least bare minimum
requirements of procedural fairness.
2 70
3. The Binding Arbitration Model
Despite the theoretical attractiveness of an administrative/
constitutional law model, this approach to resolving health care
coverage disputes may prove too burdensome and uncertain to be
attractive to contracting parties. This model still follows an
adversarial process, which might be viewed as ill-suited to the matter
at hand, and it requires intricate contractual provisions that have
not been tested in the courts. Therefore, the parties might view an
entirely nonjudicial model of dispute resolution as the most
attractive.
Several such models are available,2 71 but the one deserving the
268 See generally SCHvARTZ, supra note 163, at 354-57.
269 See id. at 357.
270 See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195-200 (1982) (finding that it was not
unconstitutional for Medicare claims administrators to hire their own private hearing
officers to resolve disputes, and that there was no evidence these officers had an
incentive to deny claims or that their independent judgment was otherwise
compromised).
These comments assume a quasi-adjudicative decision. A quasi-legislative
decision to define in advance a general category of coverage or noncoverage does not
require the same degree of insulation from bias. Because these class-based decisions
affect the insured pool more broadly, they are more subject to competitive market
penalties if the decision goes astray. Therefore, participation of management
personnel should not be absolutely precluded,just as it is permissible for legislators
to have a predisposition on the merits of questions they address.
271 For a comprehensive taxonomy, see STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 7-15 (1985). One worthy model that has received no previous attention
1992] 1709
1710 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 140:1637
most attention is binding arbitration. It has received the most
experience in the health insurance context.272 The contract could
specify a small number of public representatives and physicians
from the community to form a permanent arbitration panel.
2 78
In cases where the applicability of the general assessments is in
doubt, or when no general assessment has been performed, these
arbitration panels would review the information in the particular
case, examine the insurance contract to assess what type of coverage
was intended, and review the available clinical information before
making a coverage determination. If additional technical expertise
is required, the panel would be permitted to hire outside consul-
tants to advise them on the clinical facts involved. The clinical and
coverage determinations of the panels would be binding on both
parties.
A binding arbitration model may be a superior way for the
parties to express their desire for non-judicial resolution because
this language is more likely to place the courts in a mindset that is
aware of the public policies in favor of private, contractual reme-
might be called "Solomonic dispute resolution," for it would simply split the
difference between the insurer and the subscriber where there is disagreement
between the two physicians. Indeed, this is how many prospective review mechanisms
work in practical effect, for the only penalty to the patient for ignoring a precertifica-
tion requirement is the imposition of an additional, modest copayment. See, e.g.,
Nazay v. Miller, 949 F.2d 1323 (3rd Cir. 1991) (finding no ERISA violation in
imposing a 30% penalty on failure to obtain precertification).
272 Also, this option allows the contract to incorporate a host of complex
procedural detail simply by referencing the standard set of rules maintained by the
American Arbitration Association. Therefore, it is less cumbersome than a custom-
built process. See Arnulfo P. Sulit, Inc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 847 F.2d 475,
478-79 (8th Cir. 1988) (upholding arbitration clause in ERISA pension benefit plan);
LADIMER, supra note 209, at 149-50, 173-80 (discussing state laws authorizing
arbitration generally, arbitration of malpractice claims, and arbitration by HMOs); cf.
Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 552 P.2d 1178, 1179-80 (Cal. 1976) (en banc)
(upholdingHMO arbitration of malpractice complaint). ButseeWheelerv. St.Joseph
Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 783-91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (finding arbitration clause
invalid where clause was not brought to hospital admittee's attention when he was
signing a "Conditions of Admission" form); Obstetrics and Gynecologists William G.
Wixted, M.D., Patrick M. Flanagan, M.D., William F. Robinson, M.D. Ltd. v. Pepper,
693 P.2d 1259, 1260-61 (Nev. 1985) (finding arbitration-of-malpractice-claim clause
invalid where patient is required to sign agreement in order to receive treatment).
Although the validity of agreements to arbitrate tort-law malpractice disputes may
continue to be in doubt, the case is much stronger for disputes arising out of
contract, where commercial law doctrine has long recognized the greater freedom to
vary contractual remedies by agreement.
278 See supra note 210 and accompanying text (advocating use of other plan
subscribers as arbitrators).
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dies. Therefore, an arbitration model may provide the greatest
degree of deference for both the substance and the procedure of
coverage determinations, whether of a quasi-legislative or a quasi-
judicial nature. 74 Moreover, depending on the composition of
the resolution mechanism, this may be the most informed and least
self-interested mechanism, and it may be the one that is most
oriented toward the ex ante, insurance-purchasing perspective on
the coverage issues.
275
CONCLUSION
Health insurance coverage disputes are subject to a complex
interplay among courts, insurers, physicians, and patients. Courts,
out of deference to treating physicians, are refusing to respect the
mechanism the parties have chosen to define the scope of coverage,
forcing them to contract in ways they prefer not to, and even then
refusing to enforce the provisions other courts have imposed. Two
forms of market failure result: pricing purchasers out of the market
altogether, or forcing them to buy more expensive insurance
products than they desire. We have proposed a mechanism that we
hope will resolve this impasse: to contract explicitly for a process
of resolving disputes over medical appropriateness rather than to
further define the substance of the criteria applied by the courts.
We do not naively assume that this process by itself can solve all
the vexing allocation problems that confront our nation's policy-
makers. We also recognize that case-specific utilization review
ultimately may not prove to be the most effective cost containment
tool.2 76 But the courts are not the proper institution for deciding
which type of managed care-utilization review, provider selectivity,
financial incentives directed to patients and physicians, or a
274 See LADIMER, supra note 209, at 149 ("Arbitration is a complete legal alternative
to litigation.... [The award] is enforceable in court, but not subject tojudicial review
except on narrow technical grounds, including fraud, duress, and procedural flaw.").
2 75 See supra text accompanying notes 151-67. This approach, however, is not a
panacea. Convening a panel in each case is more cumbersome for the insurer or
employer than simply vesting the authority with a single medical director or benefits
manager, and airing disputes in this fashion also raises problems of patient
confidentiality.
276 Purchasers of insurance may yet determine that the optimal arrangement is for
insurers to pay for whatever care within the benefit package doctors and patients
decide is in the patient's best interests, limiting the insurer's role to policing for
fraudulent billing and designing proper financial incentives to keep the decisions of
patients and doctors in check.
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combination thereof-is best. The proper role of the courts is not
to insert themselves into the center of this debate, but to stand on
the sidelines to referee the processes that are followed, with an
objective, non-result-oriented view of what the parties have agreed
to within prevailing ethical, social, and economic constraints.
